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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past fifty years, trademark licensing' has emerged as a pre-
ferred method of producing and marketing goods in the United States
and abroad. One recent study reports that over fifty billion dollars
worth of licensed goods were sold in the United States in one year
alone.2 Another study identifies over 1,500 different types of licensed
products that are sold through trademark licensing arrangements an-
nually. Numerous businesses use licensing arrangements to produce
and sell a diverse array of consumer and industrial goods. Ralph Lau-
ren's trademarks appear on clothing, furniture and home accessories,
most of which are manufactured by independent trademark licensees.4
Similarly, Serta, Simmons and Sealy produce most of their mattresses
through trademark licensees.5  Coca-Cola licenses its marks not only
' I define trademark licensing as any contractual arrangement wherein the owner of a trade
name or trademark licenses its name or mark to another entity, usually, but not necessarily, for a
fee. Under the agreement, the licensee then has a contractual right to produce and sell goods
bearing the licensor's mark. Throughout this Article, I refer to trademark licensing simply as
"licensing." Unless a different type of licensing is indicated, the reader should assume that I am
referring to trademark licensing.
2 See NEir J. WILKOF, TRADEMARK LICENSING 1 (1995) (footnote omitted).
3 See Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, An Insider's Guide to Royalty Rates 1
(1998).
4 See, e.g., Glacier Optical, Inc. v. Optique Del Monde, Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 646, 647 (D. Or.
1993) (noting that Ralph Lauren licenses his marks to related companies and independent
trademark licensees); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. County Line Fashions, Inc., 661 F. Supp 89, 91
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (same); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Diebolt, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 786, 7871(l). Kan.
1986) (same).
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to bottling companies, but also to clothing manufacturers who, in
turn, make Coke pants, Coke beach towels, Coke T-shirts and Coke
baseball caps.6 Michael Jordan licenses his marks for use on Air Jor-
dan Nike gym shoes and men's cologne.7 These are only some of the
businesses in which licensing plays a prominent role.
Despite this marked increase in licensing activity, courts have not
developed a coherent theory, or even a clear set of rules, to determine
whether trademark licensors should be held vicariously liable for de-
fective products that are produced by their licensees! This Article
explores a particular strand of the problem. Specifically, this Article
examines whether a trademark licensor should be held liable for its
licensees' products when the licensor, by placing its name or mark on
a product, induces consumers to purchase the product in the belief
that the licensor made the product or otherwise vouched for its
safety.9
5 See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manu-
facturing Co. v. Scaly, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 337 (7th Cir. 1978); Sealy Mattress Company
of Michigan, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc. 789 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1986); Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta
Assocs., Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 277 (N.D. lI1. 1972); United States v. Serta Assocs., Inc.,
160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 142 (N.D. 1l1. 1968).
6 See Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing-Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 641, 648 (1988) (discussing Coke's licensing contracts with independent
bottlers and the Murjani clothing company).
7 See Mike Wise, Michael Jordan's Next Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1997, at B7 (dis-
cussing Jordan's trademark licensing contracts with Nike)
s In a separate article, I propose a comprehensive analytical framework for assessing
whether a manufacturer's liability should be imputed to a trademark licensor under any circum-
stances. See David J. Franklyn, Toward A Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for Trade-
mark Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L REV. 1 (1998). That article argues that licensors should be af-
forded an initial presumption of non-liability, and that this initial presumption should be rebut-
table by proof that the licensor engaged in conduct that satisfies one of five proposed "piercing"
tests. Specifically, I argue that the presumption of licensor non-liability should be disregarded if
a plaintiff proves that a particular licensor. (1) was the "functional equivalent" of a manufac-
turer of the defective goods (i.e., the licensor established design or manufacturing specifications,
safety standards, or product warnings or otherwise controlled its licensee such that the respec-
tive entities were "alter egos" of each other); (2) controlled the particular activity (such as prod-
uct design) that gave rise to the product defect at issue in the case; (3) knew--or reasonably
should have known-that the licensee was not adequately insured against reasonably foresee-
able product liability risks; (4) induced consumers to believe that the licensor manufactured (or
vouched for the safety of) the licensed goods, and that plaintiff, in fact, purchased the goods in
reliance on such a belief; or (5) contracted with a foreign licenseelmanufacturer who is not
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the state where the defective goods were sold. See id. at 7-
8. The present Article extends and continues the analysis of the fourth test.
9 To date, courts have not developed a comprehensive theory to identify the instances in
which consumer perceptions alone provide a sufficient ground for imposing vicarious liability
on a trademark licensor. This Article does not attempt to develop such a comprehensive theory.
Rather, my inquiry here is confined to the apparent manufacturer doctrine, and to a considera-
tion of whether that doctrine might serve as an effective vehicle for holding trademark licensors
legally responsible for defective products that bear their marks or names. There may be cases in
which a licensor would not be liable under the apparent manufacturer doctrine and yet still
would be subject to liability under some other theory-including, for example, the apparent
agency doctrine, which similarly relies on consumer perceptions as a basis for liability. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors' Liability when Franchisees Are Apparent Agents: An Em-
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To the extent that courts have addressed this question at all, they
have focused primarily on the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine.
That doctrine, as set forth in section 400 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, holds that an entity that "puts out" a product as its own will
be held liable as an apparent manufacturer of the product. The effect
of the doctrine is to substitute the apparent manufacturer for the actual
manufacturer and to subject the apparent manufacturer to the same
liability as would apply to the actual manufacturer. 10 A number of
courts have applied the apparent manufacturer doctrine to trademark
licensors."
Notwithstanding this body of law, the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability section 14 holds that the apparent manufac-
turer doctrine does not apply to trademark licensors under these cir-
cumstances.' 2 The new Restatement's position apparently is based on
a number of cases in which courts have refused to extend the apparent
manufacturer doctrine to trademark licensors. 13 These cases hold that
the doctrine does not apply to licensors because (1) the doctrine origi-
nated as a means of imputing a manufacturer's liability to house-
branding retail sellers before the advent of section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts; and (2) trademark licensors are not
"sellers." On this view, section 400 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts was designed, and is specifically worded, to impose liability
only on retail "sellers" who, by placing their house labels on goods,
hold themselves out as manufacturers of those goods.14  Because
pirical and Policy Analysis of 'Common Knowledge' About Franchising, 20 HOFSTRA L REV.
609, 645 (1992) (discussing the common knowledge doctrine, which states that "it is 'common
knowledge' that independent outlets often display signs indicating that they sell certain, well-
known, trademarked goods; the customers thus cannot reasonably rely upon these signs as
'manifestations' of agency, permitting them to obtain relief against the trademark licensor...
for the acts of an apparent agent, the licensee"). A comprehensive analysis of such theories is
beyond the scope of the present Article.
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965). The apparent manufacturer essen-
tially "steps into the shoes" of the actual manufacturer and defends the product-or the manu-
facturer's conduct-in the same way the actual manufacturer would if it were a defendant in the
suit (which it may well be). Thus, if the actual manufacturer would be subject to strict liability,
the apparent manufacturer will be subject to strict liability as well. Similarly, if the actual
manufacturer would be subject to a negligence standard, the apparent manufacturer is required
to defend the actual manufacturer's conduct under that standard.
"For a more thorough discussion of cases applying the apparent manufacturer doctrine to
trademark licensors, see infra Part IlL
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 14 cmt. d (1998) (stating
that the apparent manufacturer doctrine "does not, by its terms, apply to the owner of a trade-
mark who licenses a manufacturer to place the licensor's trademark... on the manufacturer's
product and distribute it as though manufactured by the licensor"); see also Kenneth B. Ger-
main, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors in an Era of "Accountability": A Tale of Three
Cases, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 128, 136 (1979) (suggesting that the apparent manufacturer doc-
trine applies only to house-branding sellers, and not to trademark licensors); infra Part III
13 See infra Part III.
14 If the doctrine is confined in this manner, it has little utility, given that all sellers are sub-
ject to strict liability under section 402A. The doctrine may have some utility in states that do
[Vol. 49:671
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trademark licensors do not "sell" the goods on which their marks ap-
pear, they fall outside the ambit of the doctrine.
It is doubtful whether this view accurately restates existing law,
given the substantial number of courts that have applied the apparent
manufacturer doctrine to non-selling, non-distributing trademark li-
censors. 15  More fundamentally, the new Restatement's position is
questionable as a matter of social and economic policy.
In this Article, I argue that trademark licensors should be sub-
jected to liability under the apparent manufacturer doctrine in two
situations: 16 (1) when a licensor induces consumers to believe the li-
censor manufactured the product, or (2) when a licensor induces con-
sumers to believe that the licensor controlled the standards or specifi-
cations for manufacturing the product.17  Under either prong of the
proposed test, a plaintiff would be required to show that a reasonable
consumer of the licensed product would have relied on the trademark
in the requisite manner. Once the plaintiff makes this showing, courts
would then presume that the actual consumer of the product at issue
in fact so relied. However, trademark licensors would be permitted to
rebut this presumption, and defeat liability, by showing that the actual
consumer did not, in fact, so rely. Finally, under the approach pro-
posed here, a trademark licensor would be absolved of liability by
showing that the actual manufacturer was jurisdictionally available
and able to satisfy a likely judgment against it.
not extend strict liability to retail sellers and in states that place substantial limitations on the
application of strict liability to non-manufacturers.
15 Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that there is a split of authority as to whether the
apparent manufacturer doctrine applies to non-selling trademark licensors, and that the new
Restatement has chosen to follow a particular line of cases. See infra Part IV.
16 The test proposed here is consistent with the control-based tests I advance in my earlier
article on licensor liability. There, I argue that a trademark licensor should be held vicariously
liable for defective products produced by its licensees if the licensor is the functional equivalent
of a manufacturer. See Franklyn, supra note 8, at 49. That article argues that the primary test
for determining whether a licensor is the functional equivalent of a manufacturer should be
whether the licensor provided specifications and standards for manufacturing the defective
goods. The consumer reliance test proposed in the present Article is symmetrical with the con-
trol-based test advanced in the earlier article; under the test proposed here, a trademark licensor
would be subject to imputed liability based on the appearance of its control over its licensees if,
and only if, the licensor would be subject to such liability if it in fact had exercised such control
over its licensees. In short, if a trademark licensor who actually functions as a manufacturer is
vicariously liable for its licensees' goods, then liability should similarly attach to any licensor
who appears to function as a manufacturer of those goods.
17 Given the fact that modem trademark licensing is allowed only if the licensor "controls
the quality" of the licensed goods, it could be argued that all trademarks implicitly represent that
the trademark owner is the "functional equivalent' of a manufacturer and therefore liable under
the proposed test. However, as I show infra, it is highly doubtful that the quality control re-
quirement requires licensors to provide standards and specifications for manufacturing a product
or otherwise to assure product safety. See infra Part I(D). Moreover, consumers clearly do not
assume that licensors fulfill such a role in all licensing situations. See id.
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The proposed approach validates society's interest in holding li-
censors accountable for implicitly vouching for the safety of their li-
censees' goods. It protects consumers who detrimentally rely on
trademarks as substitutes for investigation into the safety and quality
of goods. It preserves a causal connection between the licensor's
holding itself out as the manufacturer and the plaintiff's injuries by
requiring proof of actual and justifiable reliance. And it minimizes
unnecessary litigation and insurance costs (while still ensuring an
adequate source of compensation) by immunizing licensors who
demonstrate that the actual manufacturer is solvent and subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in states where the product was sold.
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. Part II
provides an overview of the basic functions of trademarks and of the
historical development of trademark licensing. Part I summarizes
the history of the apparent manufacturer doctrine and its application
to trademark licensors in the case law to date. Part IV provides a
critical assessment of the apparent manufacturer doctrine as it has
been construed by the Restatement (Third) of Torts and argues that
the doctrine should apply to trademark licensors under the test pro-
posed above.
II. TRADEMARKS
This section first defines basic terms used in trademark licensing
and discusses the essential functions of trademarks. It then provides
an overview of the historical development of trademark licensing.
A. Basic Definitions
The term "trademark" generally refers to "any word, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person to iden-
tify and distinguish his or her goods.., from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown."' 18 By contrast, the term "trade name" is a name
that identifies a business or an enterprise. 19 A trade name can also be
a trademark, and courts often use these terms interchangeably.
Trademark ownership rights are acquired when a person combines
origination of a mark with its actual use in trade.20 This understand-
18 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
19 See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 4:13 (4th ed. 1996).
20 See id. § 3:1 ("[Tlhe requirements for qualification of a word or symbol as a trademark
can be broken down into [two] elements: (1) the tangible symbol: a word, name, symbol or
device or any combination of these; (2) a type of use: actual adoption and use ofthe symbol as a
mark by a manufacturer or seller of goods or services ....") (footnotes omitted).
676 [Vol. 49:671
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ing of ownership led some courts at one time to hold that a trademark
owner could not license his mark until he had used it himself.21 This
is no longer the prevailing view. 22 Today, trademark owners are al-
lowed to license marks that were not previously used. As with other
forms of property, a significant facet of trademark ownership rights is
the ability to exclude others from using the same or confusingly
similar marks. A corollary of the right to exclude is the right to per-
mit others to use the mark.
B. Trademark Functions
It is generally recognized that trademarks may function as: (1) in-
dicators of the physical source of goods, (2) indicators of the secon-
dary source of goods, (3) indicators that particular goods come from a
common source of quality control standards, or (4) advertising tools
that influence consumers to purchase goods based on past positive
experiences with similarly marked goods.23 These trademark func-
tions are discussed below.
1. Primary Source Indicators
Historically, trademarks were viewed as representing only the
"physical source" or "origin" of the products upon which the trade-
mark was placed.24 Thus, a trademark such as "Amour Meats" was
viewed as signifying that the Amour Meat Company manufactured
the product. Under this view, trademark licensing was considered
improper because it "misled" consumers as to the physical source of
the product25  Consumers were likely to believe the product came
from a source that was associated with the trademark, not from the
anonymous manufacturer/licensee.
By contrast, under the modem view, trademarks still may identify
a "source," but that source can be "anonymous." Thus, under this
21 See id. § 16:1.
2 See id. ("[U]nder the new procedure inaugurated on November 16, 1989, a firm can get
an early priority date by filing an intent to use application in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office .... This procedure enables a company to 'reserve a mark' before actually using it in
trade.").
23 See id. §3:4.
24 See Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Lavs in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J.
1171, 1174 (1963) ("Originally, trademarks were thought to represent to the consumer the
source or origin of the producer or service to which they were affixed, i.e. the place and person
from which or whom the goods or services emanated.") (footnotes omitted).
2 The seminal case articulating the "physical source" theory of trademarks and holding that
trademark licensing was illegal is McMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chemical Manufacturing
Co., 113 F. 468 (8th Cir. 1901). There, the court held that a trademark could not be licensed
unless the trademark owner transferred its entire business to the licensee. See id. at 474-75.
McMahan is no longer an accurate statement of the law.
1999]
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view, consumers may not know who manufactures "Banlon" fabrics;
they only expect that whatever they buy bearing the "Banlon" label
comes from a single source and is of consistent quality. This view of
trademarks is reflected in the 1984 amendments to the Lanham Act,
which state that a mark will "indicate the source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown., 26 The new view of trademarks-as indica-
tors of a single, albeit anonymous, source and of a consistent quality
of products-laid the theoretical foundation for modem trademark
licensing.
2. Secondary Source Indicators
Trademarks may also "serve to identify and distinguish a 'secon-
dary source' in the sense of indicating sponsorship or authorization by
a recognized entity." 27 Indeed, secondary source identification may
be the primary function of trademarks when two different marks ap-
pear on the same product, as is often the case in promotional licens-
ing. For example, the name or logo of a sports team on clothing may
indicate that the team authorizes, endorses and licenses the sale of
such apparel by the manufacturer. Similarly, the word "McDonald's"
appearing on T-shirts or other clothing may indicate to consumers
that McDonald's Corporation authorizes, endorses and licenses the
sale of such clothing by the manufacturer. In like manner, the name
"Michael Jordan" or phrase "I love Mike" on shoes manufactured by
Nike, Inc. may indicate that Michael Jordan authorizes and endorses
the sale of those particular shoes.
In each of these examples, a trademark functions to indicate a sec-
ondary source that sponsors and endorses a product manufactured by
another entity. However, trademarks may also serve to induce con-
sumers erroneously to conclude that the trademark owner manufac-
tured the goods on which the trademark appears. This is especially
likely to occur in situations where the name of the actual manufac-
turer does not appear on the goods, and the trademark owner's name
or mark is the sole identifier on the goods. In these circumstances, it
could be said that the trademark erroneously suggests that the trade-
mark owner is the primary (producing) source, whereas, in reality, it
is only the secondary source.
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). While trademark registration at both the
state and federal levels is common, it is neither required, nor a prerequisite to establishing own-
ership of a mark. However, because federal registration offers the registrant a variety of bene-
fits, most trademark licensors register under the federal scheme, as set forth in the Lanham Act.
The Lanham Act governs the use of federally registered trademarks.
27 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 3:4.
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3. Quality Indicators
Under the modem version of the source theory, trademarks in-
dicate that goods bearing the same mark are of the same general
quality. This has been termed the "quality" or "guarantee" func-
tion of trademarks.28 This view holds that trademarks can indicate
to consumers that goods bearing that mark come from a single
source, but it is a single source of consistent quality control as op-
posed to a single source of manufacture.29 Under this theory, the
chief function of a trademark "is a kind of 'warranty' to purchasers
that they will receive, when they purchase goods bearing the mark,
goods of the same character and source, anonymous as it may be,
as other goods previously purchased bearing the mark that have
already given the purchaser satisfaction."30 Under this theory,
trademarks do not necessarily signify that a product is of a high
quality. Rather, the quality assurance theory simply holds that a
mark indicates that "the quality level, whatever it is, will remain
consistent and predictable among all goods or services supplied
under the mark., 31  Thus, a trademark is not a guarantee or war-
ranty of quality in the traditional, legal sense.32 The quality assur-
ance function of trademarks is reflected in the Lanham Act, which
holds that the dual nature of trademarks is to indicate either source
or quality or both, depending on the manner of use.33
4. The Advertising Function of Trademarks
Trademarks may also serve an advertising function. Indeed, a
trademark is "but a species of advertising, its purpose being to fix the
2 See Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Trademaiks: Prestige, Practice and Protection, 4 GA. L.
REV. 322, 324 (1970) (stating that trademarks "serve as a guarantee of the consistency of nature,
quality and characteristics of the goods. This is known as the guarantee function"); see also
James K. Eckmann, Note, Antitrust Problems in Trademark Franchising, 17 STAN. L. REv. 926,
926 (1965) ("Under the 'guaranty' theory the function of the trademark is to assure the con-
sumer of a consistent level of product quality .... ).
29 See In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (stating that a "mark
primarily functions to indicate a single quality control source of the goods or services involved
3o Revlon, Inc. v. La Maur, Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. 602 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1968).
31 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 3:10.
32 See Kevin Parks, "Naked" Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the
"Quality Control Requirement" in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 539 (1992)
(arguing that a trademark is not a "warranty" of quality in the legal sense). But see Margaret
Frenkel Goldstein, Products Liability and the Trademark Owner: When a Trademark Is a War-
ranty, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 587 (1977) (arguing that a trademark should be treated as a legal
warranty of product quality in certain circumstances).
33 See McCarthy, supra note 19, § 3:10 ("Passage of the Lanham Act in 1946 firmly estab-
lished the quality function of trademarks as the rule of law. The dual nature of trademarks is to
indicate source or quality, or both, depending upon the manner of use .... ").
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identity of the article and the name of the producer in the minds of
people who see the advertisement ... Thus, "[i]f the trademark
owner succeeds in creating a favorable image of its trademark in the
marketplace, the mark becomes a significant factor in stimulating
sales. 35 This is true whether the trademark is used on goods made by
the trademark owner or its licensee. In either case, the trademark
symbolizes something the purchaser desires, and for this reason it
stimulates sales.
The advertising function of trademarks is essential to the eco-
nomics of all trademark-licensing arrangements. A licensee pays
to use the mark of another because the mark will help sell the
goods. The licensor is willing to allow another to use its mark be-
cause it believes that in so doing it will profit. While the adver-
tising function of trademarks underlies all licensing arrangements,
trademarks may serve only an advertising function in the promo-
tional licensing context. In promotional licensing, the consumer is
more interested in identification with the trademark owner than in
the quality of the goods bearing the trademark. Thus, for example,
when a consumer purchases a baseball cap with the emblem of the
Chicago Cubs on it, he does so because he wishes to identify with
the Cubs, not because he believes that the Cubs manufactured the
cap or even that it was necessarily made pursuant to standards
dictated by the Cubs. In this situation, the trademark stimulates
sales because the consumer identifies with the aura, mystique or
image the mark conveys, not because the mark indicates the
source, origin or quality of the goods.
C. Trademark Licensing
At early common law, trademark owners generally were not per-
mitted to license their marks to others because trademarks were
viewed solely as indicators of the physical source of goods.36 Li-
censing was considered illegal because consumers would be "misled"
as to the physical source of goods if another entity's trademark ap-
peared on goods that were manufactured by unidentified licensees.37
Beginning in the 1930s, there developed a judicially-led trend to
permit trademark licensing so long as the trademark owner exercised
34 Northern Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774,774 (7th Cir. 1927).
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1990).
36 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 3:8.
37 See id. § 18:39 (stating the view that since trademarks refer to the physical origin of a
product, trademark licensing is impossible).
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control over the quality of the trademarked goods that were produced
by its licensees. 38 However, "not until the passage of the Lanham
Trade Mark Act in 1946 did that trend become the rule."39 To under-
stand how this change in the law came about, it is necessary to con-
sider both commercial and intellectual trends in the early twentieth
century.
With rapid changes in the way goods were manufactured and dis-
tributed in the early 1900s, and the corresponding explosion of
American industry, pressure began to mount for a new theory of
trademarks that would take a more flexible approach to trademark
licensing.n° In a period of mass production and fragmentation of la-
bor, it became clear that a system that allowed for trademark licensing
held many advantages. For example, if licensing were allowed, a
business with an established trademark could invent and design a
product and then "outsource" the actual manufacture of the product to
another company, provided that the manufacturer affixed the inven-
tor's name or mark to the goods. The licensing arrangement could
thus permit an entity to develop a wider array of other products, while
simultaneously providing additional work for independent manufac-
turers. In this period of industrial expansion, it became clear that
trademark licensing could lead to greater diversification of goods and
profit maximization.
Against this backdrop of changing commercial realities, an im-
portant series of developments occurred in the world of ideas. In
1927, Frank I. Schechter, a New York attorney, published a law re-
view article entitled The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, in
which he argued that trademarks serve dual functions.4 1 He stated
that in addition to serving as indicators of source, trademarks could
also serve a "persuasive" function. Schechter recognized that:
[T]he trademark is not merely the symbol of good will but
often the most effective agent for the creation of good will,
imprinting upon the public mind an anonymous and imper-
sonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further
satisfactions. The mark actually sells the goods. And, self-
" See id §§ 3:9, 3:10, 18:42; see also Parks, supra note 32, at 533 ('Sy 1927, courts were
searching for a vehicle through which trademark licensing could be justified and legitimized
39 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 315 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40 See Parks, supra note 32, at 533.
41 See Frank L Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV.
813 (1927).
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evidently, the more distinctive the mark, the more effective is
its selling power.42
Also, Schechter urged the adoption of a more expansive theory of
trademark protection that took into account "the fact that the creation
and retention of custom, rather than the designation of source, is the
primary purpose of the trademark today."
43
Courts and commentators quickly followed Schechter in espousing
the notion that trademarks do not necessarily function as indicators of
source, but also function as "guarantees of satisfaction." 44 Thus, the
new theory of trademarks was soon referred to as the "guarantee the-
ory."45 However, this label was probably misleading-or at least a
misnomer-since Schechter never asserted that a trademark was
equivalent to a legal guarantee of quality. Nevertheless, the "guaran-
tee theory" was widely accepted and was soon refined into the "qual-
ity assurance theory," 46 which by the 1930s, was widely embraced by
the courts.47 The new theory held that trademarks do not necessarily
always indicate physical source, but do always indicate that similarly
marked goods are of a consistent level of quality.48 Under this the-
ory, consumers "assume that products sold under the same trademark
will be of equal quality regardless of the actual physical source or
producer of the goods." 49
This new approach to trademarks paved the way for judicial ac-
ceptance of trademark licensing. So long as the trademark licensor
monitored the quality of the trademarked goods to ensure that they
were of a "consistent quality," trademark licensing was deemed
proper because it did not "mislead" the public.50 However, if the li-
censor failed to exercise appropriate quality control, the trademarked
goods might fail to conform to the consumer's expectations and thus
frustrate the public's reliance on the mark as a symbol of a consistent
level of quality. Hence, under the emerging "quality theory," uncon-
trolled licensing-sometimes referred to as "naked" licensing-was
considered illegal.5 1 The penalty for engaging in naked licensing was
that the licensor was deemed to have "abandoned" his mark-i.e., the
42Id. at 819.
431 Id. at 822.
44 See Parks, supra note 32, at 532-34.
45 id.
46Id. at 532.
47 See id at 532-33
48 See MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 3:10.
4 Id. § 18:40.50 Id. § 18:42; see also Parks, supra note 32, at 533-35.
51 See MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 18:42; Parks supra note 32, at 534.
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trademark owner lost its right to exclude others from using the trade-
mark.5
2
The judicially-created trend to allow controlled licensing was
codified in the Lanham Act in 1946. 3 While the Lanham Act does
not specifically provide for trademark licensing, it permits use of a
trademark by a "related company." 54 A "related company" is defined
as "any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the
mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on
or in connection with which the mark is used." 55 It is now firmly
established that the test of a "related company" is the same as that
used at common law to determine whether adequate quality control is
exercised over a trademark licensee.5 6 And it is equally clear that un-
der the Lanham Act's definition of "abandonment," trademark li-
censing in the absence of "quality control" results in relinquishment
of the trademark owner's right to exclude others from using the
mark.57 For the last fifty years, the quality assurance theory of trade-
marks-and the corollary rule requiring trademark licensors to con-
trol the quality of the goods or services produced by their licensees-
has dominated trademark licensing in the United States. 8
During this same time period, trademark licensing exploded in
volume and, in some respects, evolved beyond the model which gave
rise to the "controlled licensing" concept. Historically, "classical li-
censing" arrangements began with licensors who had previously
manufactured a particular product or group of products.59 The licen-
sor then essentially outsourced the manufacturing of those goods to
quasi-independent licensees who, in turn, manufactured goods bear-
ing the licensor's mark.60 Ordinarily, the licensor provided its licen-
sees with detailed standards and specifications for making the li-
censed goods.6' In this way, the licensor ensured the integrity of its
mark in the public marketplace.
52 See id
51 See id.
5 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
55 id.
56 See, e.g., National Trailways Bus Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 352,
356-57 & n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding that "related company" did not exist in the absence of
control over user's nature and quality of services); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 18:42
("The 'Lanham Act['s related company requirement] clearly carries forward the view of these
latter cases that controlled licensing does not work on abandonment of the licensor's registra-
tion, while a system of naked licensing does."') (quoting Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959)).
57 See MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 18:42.58 See Parks, supra note 32, at 532-33.59 See Marks, supra note 6, at 646.
6 See i&
6I See Ua
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Classical licensing was soon eclipsed by franchise licensing, "a
system based on non-exclusive, multiple trademark licenses." 62 In the
typical franchise relationship, a licensee is authorized to produce a
product in accordance with a licensor's standards and specifications
and the licensor is expected to monitor the licensee to ensure that
those standards were followed.63  Generally, the licensor and the li-
censee are equally knowledgeable about the product or industry in-
volved.64 Indeed, in many cases, the licensee, as the party that in-
vented or conceived of the product, has more familiarity with its de-
sign and specifications than does the licensor.65 Many trademark li-
censing arrangements, especially those that occur in the franchising
context, continue to follow this traditional model.66
In more recent years, however, different forms of licensing ar-
rangements have emerged which, collectively, have been referred to
as "collateral product licensing." 67 Collateral licensing has been de-
fined as "the use of a mark on goods (or services) which are different,
or which are used in media different, from those in connection with
which the public recognition and demand were first created."6' For
example, if Microsoft, which is known primarily for its computers,
decided to license its trademark to a refrigerator manufacturer, this
would be an example of "collateral product licensing." Collateral
licensing has grown rapidly in the last twenty years and accounts for a
substantial portion of total retail dollars earned through licensing. 69
A form of collateral product licensing is "promotional licensing,"
which is the use of a mark in circumstances where its primary func-
tion is to engender "consumer identification" with the mark as op-
posed to consumer reliance on the mark as an assurance of "consistent
62 W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 89
DICK. L. Rnv. 363, 364 (1985). This method of merchandising goods or services became
prevalent after World War II "and in 1982 accounted for $339 billion or 31 percent of merchan-
dising in the United States." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, "[i]n 1982, franchising claimed one
third of every retail sales dollar in the United States." Id. at 364 n.11.
63 See id
64 See Marks, supra note 6, at 646.
6 For an excellent discussion of the significance of the quality control requirement in the
context of promotional trademark licensing see id. at 648-49 (discussing the difficulties that
licensors face setting licensing standards licensees' products in an unfamiliar industry).
6 Classical licensing is not limited to franchise relationships. Established corporations
commonly outsource the manufacture of their goods to trademark licensees to save costs. In
1980, for example, Questor Corporation "produced nearly all of its Spalding products itself, and
lost $12.6 million on sales of $273 million." Id. at 647. To remedy the situation, Questor de-
cided to outsource its manufacturing operations to trademark licensees, and, three years later,
"earned $12 million on $250 million of sales." Id.
67 Id. at 646.
(s Id. (observing that, in 1986, brand name licensing sales accounted for 28% of the total li-
censed product market).
69 See id.
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quality."70 Both Alfred Marks and W.J. Keating have discussed the
differences between classical and promotional licensing.71  Marks
points out that promotional trademark licensing emerged in the 1970s,
led by a number of famous merchandising forerunners, such as
Mickey Mouse, Star Wars and Snoopy.72 Colleges and universities,
the NFL and the Olympic Committee followed suit, licensing the use
of their names and emblems to various manufacturers.73 "In 1985,"
for example, "the Coca Cola Company authorized Murjani Interna-
tional Ltd. to design and manufacture a line of Coca-Cola apparel
which was estimated to gross $100 million in wholesale sales during
1986."74 Thus, today, we can buy Coke pants, as well as IBM beach
towels and Michael Jordan gym shoes. All of these are examples of
promotional trademark licensing.
As Keating explains, in more classical forms of trademark licens-
ing, the consumer (at least theoretically) is "motivated to purchase a
product bearing a trademark because of the consumer's expectation
that the product will meet the quality standards that the trademark
owner achieves."75 Conversely, in promotional trademark licensing,
the consumer "is not motivated by the quality level of the product, but
rather wishes to identify with the trademark owner.' 76 In promotional
licensing, "[t]he trademark proclaims the exhibitor's loyalty, admira-
tion or sympathy with the organization represented by the trademark
... ,77 In the promotional licensing context, available empirical data
suggests that consumers do not believe that the licensor made or es-
tablished quality standards for a particular product, but rather that the
licensor authorized the use of its name or mark in connection with the
product and will financially benefit from the sale of the product in
some way.78 In promotional licensing, a trademark's primary func-
tion is to help sell the goods. The trademark does not indicate physi-
7o See id.
71 See Keating, supra note 62, at 365-69 (discussing the advent of promotional trademark li-
censing and its impact on trademark law); Marks, supra note 6, at 641 (discussing the need for a
new standard of policing quality control in trademark licensing due to changes in the licensing
market place).
72 See Marks, supra note 6, at 646.
73 See id
74 IL at 647.
7S Keating, supra note 62, at 372.
76 Id. (citing University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d
Cir. 1982) ("The entire impetus for the sale is the consumer's desire to identify with Pitt or,
perhaps more realistically, with Pitt's successful athletic programs.").77 1id
78 See id. (citing University of Pittsburgh, 686 F.2d at 1047 ("No one would seriously assert
that a significant segment of the public believes that Pitt actually manufactured the goods in-
volved.")).
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cal source or a "consistent level of quality," or even that the trade-
mark owner is a source of quality control standards for the goods.79
D. The "Quality Control" Requirement
Given the ambiguities in the quality assurance theory, courts and
commentators have had considerable difficulty defining the contours
of the quality control requirement. As one commentator has ob-
served, "[n]either 'quality' nor 'control' is defined in the Lanham
Act; they are common law creatures whose evolution is incomplete
and inconsistent."80 It may be helpful to examine each of these terms
separately.
1. "Quality"
No one has ever suggested that "quality" necessarily means "high
quality" for purposes of defining a licensor's duties under the Lanham
Act. Rather, it is generally agreed that quality in this context means
"even quality" or a "consistent level of quality." 8' The underlying
notion seems to be that consumers come to associate trademarks with
a certain level of quality and that they will be misled if items bearing
that trademark no longer meet the same standard of quality.
Thus, if consumers normally associate the K-Mart trademark with
a relatively low level of quality, they will expect that same low level
of quality whenever they buy goods bearing the K-Mart symbol. If
the K-Mart merchandise is better than they expected, they will have
been deceived-pleasantly deceived, but deceived nonetheless. If,
however, consumers normally associate the K-Mart trademark with a
high level of quality, and the K-Mart merchandise they purchase is
worse than expected, they will be similarly deceived, this time un-
pleasantly.
To the extent courts have discussed this issue, they have held that
"quality" means "consistent quality" in this context.82 Justice Stewart
expressed the concept succinctly by stating that, "[a]n important in-
gredient of the premium brand inheres in the consumer's belief,
79 Public perception is not the only area in which classical and promotional trademark li-
censing differ. They also differ with respect to the licensor's practical ability to establish qual-
ity standards for the trademarked goods. A growing number of courts have, in fact, "recog-
nize[d] the right of the institution owning the trademark to control and license it without requir-
ing the quality assurance function" to be fulfilled. Keating, supra note 62, at 363-64 (citations
omitted). This approach has not taken hold as a general rule; rather, most courts have continued
to hold that promotional licensors, like other licensors, are required to satisfy the Lanham Act's
quality control requirement. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 18:42 (noting the gen-
eral rule that uncontrolled licensing works an abandonment of the mark).80 Parks, supra note 32, at 538.
81 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 3:10.
82 id.
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measured by past satisfaction and the market reputation established
by [respondent] for its products, that tomorrow's [product] will con-
tain the same premium as that purchased today. 83
To protect consumer expectations, courts have held that trademark
owners have a duty to police their licensees to ensure a consistent
level of quality.84 But courts have had difficulty defining precisely
what the term "consistent level of quality" means. One pair of com-
mentators has suggested that:
the standard of quality which the licensee must meet is that of
the licensor's own goods, whether high, low or mediocre. If
the licensor does not manufacture the [licensed] goods, the
standard may be similar products of the licensor or other li-
censees, or similar articles produced by designated competi-
tors.
85
This standard has several flaws. First, there is the "diverse qual-
ity" problem. That is, goods produced under an established mark may
have been of an "uneven" or inconsistent quality even when the
trademark owner manufactured them. Manufacturers may sell a "bad
batch" of goods because some product defects are difficult to spot.
Furthermore, the quality of any given line of goods may vary over
time, depending on the vigilance with which a manufacturer monitors
quality. Thus, it may be illogical to require a licensee to produce
goods that are of the "same quality" as those that are manufactured by
the licensor, since the licensor's own goods may not reflect a consis-
tent level of quality.
Second, such a requirement would be especially problematic in the
collateral and promotional licensing contexts. As we have seen,
8 FrC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 651 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (dissenting from
the Court's holding that the like grade and quality test of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act does not allow for consideration of brand names and national advertising); see also Societe
Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 636 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Every
product is composed of a bundle of special characteristics. The consumer who purchases what
he believes is the same product expects to receive those characteristics on every occasion.").
8 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, §§ 3:10, 18:42.
85 William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Con-
trol, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99, 101 n.ll (1980) (citations omitted); see also Ronald B. Coolley,
Related Company: The Required Relationship in Trademark Licensing, 77 TRADEMARK REP.
299, 308 (1987) (stating that the requirement of sufficient control over nature and quality of
goods is satisfied when licensor "carefully monitors" the licensee's product); F. Vern Lahart,
Control-The Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark License, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 108, 134
(1960) (describing how, in order to assure a successful licensing scheme, the licensor typically
sets standards as to the nature and quality of goods higher than that required by the courts, and,
as "[tihere is no magic formula to determine what is adequate control in a given situation,"
courts are left describing the level of control as simply "adequate"); Trademark Licensing: The
Problem of Adequate Control, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 820, 834-35 (1969) (stating that the Lan-
ham Act does not specify the amount of control the licensee must exercise over the nature and
quality of goods, nor how courts should examine the issue).
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trademark owners often wish to exploit their marks in new product
lines. 6 This is not a rare or unique occurrence; indeed, collateral
market licensing may be more common today than traditional licens-
ing. However, in collateral licensing, there are no other goods by
which to set the relevant quality benchmark. In these circumstances,
it is not reasonable to say that the quality level must be the same as
other products produced by the licensor, because the licensor will not
have produced similar products. For example, when Coca-Cola li-
censes its trademark to a teddy bear manufacturing company, Coke
can not possibly determine whether Coke teddy bears are as good as
its soft drinks. Nor can Coke teddy bears be compared with similar
products produced by other manufacturers. Which other manufactur-
ers are we to consider? All kinds of teddy bears exist-good ones,
bad ones and mediocre ones. Must Coke teddy bears be as good as
the best teddy bears that are marketed by other manufacturers?
This difficulty has left collateral licensors in a bind. Because they
have never manufactured the product they now wish to produce
through a licensee, they are not ordinarily in a position to point to a
relevant and controlling quality standard for the new product line.
Nor are they in a position to supply their licensees with specifications
or designs for the new product. Indeed, the licensor probably has ap-
proached the licensee precisely because it is experienced in the rele-
vant industry and is in a superior position to establish appropriate
specifications and quality standards for the product.
2. "Control"
Matters are made worse by the fact that courts have not been able
to articulate a consistent test for determining the degree or type of
control that licensors must exercise to satisfy the Lanham Act. The
relevant section of the Lanham Act states that a trademark is subject
to cancellation "on the ground that the registrant (A) does not control,
or is not able legitimately to exercise control over, the use of such
mark.' '87 Theoretically, control may include (1) the provision of de-
tailed specifications and standards for goods to be produced; (2) the
submission of plans, drawings, preliminary models and actual sam-
ples; (3) unannounced spot inspections of the licensor's plant and fa-
cilities; (4) detailed rules about the placement size, proportions and
86 As Parks points out, this practice may be mushrooming in recent years but it is not new.
See Parks, supra note 32, at 539 (citing Finchley, Inc. v. George Hess Co., 24 F. Supp. 94
(E.D.N.Y. 1938), as an example of an "old" case involving collateral market licensing).
8' 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(A) (1994).
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use of the trademark to be affixed; and (5) remedies for failure to
meet such standards.88
Unfortunately, it is impossible to discern from the cases a single
test for determining which type of control or how much control must
be contractually retained or actually exercised. A number of com-
mentators have observed that the relevant cases are all over the map.
8 9
At one end of the spectrum are cases holding that the licensor must
exercise extensive control over the licensee, including the provision
of initial specifications, and then police the licensee to ensure those
specifications are followed.90 Indeed, a few cases have held that the
lack of adequate control will invalidate trademark rights.91 At the
other end of the spectrum are cases holding that the mere contractual
right to exercise quality control is sufficient.92  Between these ex-
tremes are cases upholding varying degrees of control, including
cases finding no abandonment despite the licensor's "reasonable reli-
ance" on its licensees to establish specifications, set quality standards
and otherwise monitor quality. 3
Thus, it seems that, despite the articulated rule that the failure to
exercise quality control results in abandonment, courts have been re-
luctant to enforce this requirement.94 This appears to be because the
issue typically arises in the context of a licensor's suit against an in-
fringer, and in such circumstances, courts are reluctant to reward a
party with such "unclean hands. 95 Accordingly, as against a clear
infringer, courts typically stretch to find some way to uphold the li-
censor's ownership rights in the mark.96 As a result of these deci-
sions, courts have diluted the quality control requirement to the point
where its meaning is no longer clear, if it even has any meaning at
all.
97
88 See Marks, supra note 6, at 644.
89 See id. at 644-45 (stating that courts vary widely on requirement of control); see also
Parks, supra note 32, at 539-40 (same).
90 See, e.g., First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704, 1706 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (holding that facts must demonstrate that licensor had actual control).
91 See, e.g., Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n, 127 F. Supp.
217, 228-29 (W.D. Vis. 1954) (holding that there was no adequate control over commonly used
words); Heaton Enters. of Nevada Inc. v. Lang, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842, 1847 (Trademark Tr. &
App. Bd. 1988) (finding abandonment of mark and invalidity of license agreements because of
non-exercise of quality control).
92 See Parks, supra note 32, at 540 (citations omitted).
93 See, e.g., Printers Servs. Co. v. Bondurant, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1626, 1630 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
94 See Parks, supra note 32, at 541-44 (documenting courts' failure to find abandonment).
But see cases cited supra note 91 for instances in which abandonment was found.
95 Parks, supra note 32, at 547.
96 See id.
9' See id. at 544.
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3. Minimalist Quality Control Programs
For some trademark licensors, an extensive quality control pro-
gram is appealing for business reasons. For example, when Coca-
Cola licenses independent bottlers to make, bottle and distribute
Coca-Cola products, it is probably both possible and desirable for
Coca-Cola to strictly control the entire manufacturing process. In-
deed, Coca-Cola would not be able to maintain the reputation of its
products if its licensees did not use the same ingredients and formula.
Not surprisingly, then, Coca-Cola has an army of inspectors to ensure
compliance with its extensive quality control program.98 In this type
of "classical" licensing situation, the economic incentives and means
exist to provide for extensive licensor quality control.
Despite the apparent attraction of such programs in classical li-
censing situations, there is evidence that even here many licensors do
not have quality control programs. As Kevin Parks has observed,
"[a]s long as thirty years ago Senate hearings revealed widespread
evasion of the control requirement, even in traditional licensing con-
texts."99 Moreover, the problem became only worse with the rise of
collateral licensing. As Parks concludes:
Such evasion necessarily increased as "traditional" gave
way to "collateral" licensing-where the licensor had less
knowledge of the character of licensed products and therefore
less ability to control quality in a meaningful way-and then
crossed over into "merchandise" or "promotional" licensing
where there is no primary, underlying product against which
to compare the quality of licensed goods, and consumers are
motivated not by perceived quality, but by the desire to ex-
press Loyalty, Admiration or Sympathy (LAS) toward an or-
ganization or merchandising concept.
In these situations in particular, "[t]o require the owner of
the trademark to inaugurate an imaginary quality-control pro-
gram to satisfy legal requirements, constructed by courts in
dissimilar situations, is to elevate form over substance. The
trademark owner is subject to unnecessary expense without
any real benefit to consumers." Recognition of these realities
98 See Marks, supra note 6, at 648 ("A company such as the Coca-Cola company has codi-
fied licensing and franchising specifications for its independent bottlers, and staffs of inspectors
make certain that the licensing requirements are followed.").
99 Parks, supra note 32 at 544 (citing Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Con-
trol, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 820 (1969)).
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makes modem courts even less likely to strictly interpret and
enforce the quality control requirement.
100
As Parks and other commentators have recognized, many collat-
eral licensors have instituted "illusory" quality control programs in
response to the uncertain quality control standards set by courts and
their own practical inability to establish or monitor quality standards
on the licensed goods. 101 The typical "illusory" program might con-
sist of a licensing agreement reciting the "magic" language-e.g.,
giving the licensor the legal right to provide product specifications, to
set quality standards and to inspect the goods.02 In the meantime,
none of this quality control occurs.
The fact that quality control is frequently illusory has important
implications for the primary issues addressed in this Article. Specifi-
cally, the illusory nature of quality control programs, coupled with the
inherent ambiguity of the quality control requirement, may mean that
courts can not assume that trademarks always signify that the prod-
ucts on which they appear are of a consistent level of quality or that
they emanate from a single source of quality control standards. In-
deed, it is clear that licensors, licensees and consumers do not make
such assumptions.0 3 To the contrary, practical realities often make it
undesirable or inefficient for the licensor to exercise quality control.
And consumers frequently do not assume a particular trademark sig-
nifies that the trademark owner made the product or that it is the
source of quality control standards. This is especially likely to be true
in the collateral and promotional licensing contexts.
100 Id at 544-45 (quoting Keating, supra note 62, at 378).
101 See Parks, supra note 32, at 545; see also Keating, supra note 62, at 378 (arguing that
"[to require the owner of the trademark to inaugurate an imaginary quality-control program to
satisfy legal requirements, constructed by courts in dissimilar situations, is to elevate form over
substance"). As Marks observes, in the increasingly prevalent collateral licensing situation,
specifications cannot be supplied to the licensee because no one on the licensor's
staff knows what standards to specify when licensing in an unfamiliar industry. At
best, the agreement will call for merchandise based on some objective standard ....
After the agreement is executed, samples will be furnished by the licensee, advertis-
ing and labeling will be prepared and approved. Proper trademark notices will be
specified and utilized on the samples. Thereafter, active control over the licensee
will be likely to cease. The business people will be concerned with their next busi-
ness deal and will not be likely to continue reviewing the licensee's activities, so
long as the royalty checks continue to arrive on time.
Marks, supra note 6, at 648-49.
102 Indeed, in such situations, the licensor is caught in a "catch 22." If the licensor admits
that its quality control program is illusory-i.e., that it exists only on paper-it risks a finding of
abandonment in a subsequent proceeding. On the other hand, if the licensor does not make such
an admission, it risks a finding that it is vicariously liable for the torts of its licensee on the
ground that it has exercised control over the quality of the goods.
103 See Keating, supra note 62, at 372 (noting that consumers do not always assume quality
control by licensor); Marks, supra note 6, at 649 (observing that licensors and licensees do
not always assure quality control).
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Ill. THE APPARENT MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE
As we have seen, trademarks may function to identify the manu-
facturing source, or the source of standards and specifications for the
production of trademarked goods. For this reason, consumers fre-
quently conclude that trademark owners either manufactured the
goods or dictated the standards for manufacturing their licensees'
goods. Nevertheless, there is a split of authority in the reported cases
as to whether the apparent manufacturer doctrine applies to trademark
licensors. Some courts, adopting an expansive approach, have held
that the doctrine applies to licensors whenever a licensor's name or
mark appears on a product °4 Other courts, reflecting a more re-
strained approach, have held the doctrine applicable in only limited
circumstances.10 5 Still other courts have held that the doctrine does
not apply to licensors under any circumstances.10 6 The Third Re-
statement of Torts follows the latter approach.
This section first describes the basic contours and underlying ra-
tionales of the apparent manufacturer doctrine as it has been applied
to trademark licensors in the case law. It then discusses numerous
judicially created limitations that have diminished the utility of the
doctrine in the trademark-licensing context.
A. The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine and Trademark
Licensors
In its broadest formulation, the apparent manufacturer doctrine
holds that an entity that implicitly represents to the public that it is the
manufacturer of a product will be treated as though it was the actual
manufacturer of the product and will be held liable accordingly. The
doctrine is stated succinctly in section 400 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts: "one who puts out as his own product a chattel manu-
factured by another is subject to the same liability as though he were
its manufacturer."
10 7
Courts and commentators have articulated two distinct rationales
for the apparent manufacturer doctrine. First, several courts have
noted that the doctrine is a species of estoppel, i.e.:
the vendor who, through its labeling or advertising of a
product, caused the public to believe that it was the manu-
facturer and to buy the product in reliance on the vendor's
reputation and care in making it, was held to have assumed
104 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
'05 See infra Part M1(B).
106 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
,07 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
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the obligations of a manufacturer and to be estopped to deny
its identity as the manufacturer.108
According to this rationale, the doctrine focuses on what the
trademark owner did to induce consumers to believe that the trade-
mark owner actually manufactured the goods in question and pur-
chase those goods in reliance on this specific belief. If this is the
controlling rationale, it should not matter if a particular consumer
learns the identity of the true manufacturer after purchasing the prod-
uct, because she will have already purchased the product in reliance
on the reputation of the trademark owner.
A second justification sometimes given for the apparent manufac-
turer doctrine is that "where a defendant puts out a product as its own,
the purchaser has no means of ascertaining the identity of the true
manufacturer, and it is thus fair to impose liability on the party whose
actions effectively conceal the true manufacturer's identity.,109 This
rationale focuses on whether a consumer, due to the actions of the
trademark owner, is unable to identify (and sue) the true manufacturer
of the product. The trademark licensor is therefore held liable only if
the true manufacturer is unidentifiable. Courts citing this rationale
have held apparent manufacturers immune from liability if before-or
immediately after-suit was filed the apparent manufacturer informed
the plaintiffs of the identity of the product's true manufacturers
10
The official comments to section 400 do not explicitly discuss
whether the apparent manufacturer doctrine applies to trademark li-
censors. Rather, they refer to trademark owners generally and indi-
cate that the apparent manufacturer doctrine applies to those trade-
mark owners in two types of cases: (1) where the trademark owner
appears to be the actual manufacturer of the product, and (2) where
the product appears to have been made for the trademark owner and
its reputation serves as an assurance to the user of the quality of the
product's quality.
11
'
Citing these comments, a number of courts have applied the doc-
trine to trademark licensors. In Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co.,n 2 for example, the Plaintiff sued for personal injuries he incurred
while driving a forklift bearing the "Caterpillar" tradename.1 13 The
forklift was manufactured by "Towmotor," Caterpillar's wholly
103 Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ill. 1982).
"9 Id. at 201-02.
"
0See, e.g., Better Beverages, Inc. v. Mary Meschwitz, 643 S.W.2d 502 (rex. App. 1982)
(finding presumption of manufacturer status adequately rebutted by trademark owner).
"'See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965).
112 527 A.2d 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
"' See id. at 138-39.
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owned subsidiary, 114 and Caterpillar was not involved in the design,
manufacture, or marketing of the forklift.1 15 Nevertheless, the court
held that Caterpillar could be held strictly liable for the defective
forklift because "Caterpillar could expect others to purchase the prod-
uct in reliance on the skill and reputation associated with the Cater-
pillar name.
116
Brandimarti represents a broad interpretation of the apparent
manufacturer doctrine. The court did not require the injured Plaintiff
to prove that he actually relied on the Caterpillar trademark before
riding the forklift, or that the forklift owner so relied in making his
purchase decision.1 17 Nor did the court require the Plaintiff to prove
that Caterpillar exercised quality control over Towmotor or otherwise
participated in the manufacture, design or sale of the defective fork-
lift.118 Rather, the court held Caterpillar vicariously liable for its li-
censee's defective forklift solely because Caterpillar could expect
consumers to rely on the Caterpillar name when making their pur-
chase decisions.119 The court concluded that Caterpillar could have
such an expectation despite the fact that the "Towmotor" trademark
also appeared on the defective forklift.
120
The apparent manufacturer doctrine was also applied to a trade-
mark licensor in Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc. 121 There, a motorist
brought a products liability suit against a Belgian tire manufacturer
(the trademark licensee) and the manufacturer's American parent
company (the trademark licensor).122 Plaintiff alleged that he suffered
serious personal injuries when the allegedly defective tire failed dur-
ing operation of his car. 123 The court refused to hold the parent com-
pany liable under corporate veil-piercing principles, but nevertheless
found that the relationship between the two companies, coupled with
the manufacturer's use of the parent company's trademark on the de-
fective tire, provided ample justification for imposing strict liability
on the licensor under section 400.124
14 See id. at 139.
115 See id.
116 Id. at 139-40; see also Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1968) (holding dis-
tributor strictly liable where it had its own trademark embossed on the casing of tires manufac-
tured by another).
117 See Brandimarti, 527 A.2d at 139-40.
"8 See id. at 139.
19 See id. at 139-40.
'20 See id. at 139.
12' 389 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. 1979).
' See id. at 157.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 162-63.
[Vol. 49:671
APPARENT MANUFACTURER DOCTRINE
In so holding, the Illinois Supreme Court took an expansive view
of the apparent manufacturer doctrine, stating that:
[a] licensor is an integral part of the marketing enterprise, and
its participation in the profits reaped by placing a product in
the stream of commerce presents the same public policy rea-
sons for the applicability of strict liability which supported
the imposition of such liability on wholesalers, retailers and
lessors. The societal purposes underlying [strict liability]
mandate that the doctrine be applicable to one who, for a con-
sideration, authorizes the use of his trademark, particularly
when, as here, the product bears no indication that it was
manufactured by any other entity.125
A similar result was reached in Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons
Co. 126 There, the Plaintiff was badly injured when her dress caught
fire at a dinner party. 127 Printed on the label of the dress were these
words:
BAN-LON Fashion
This BAN-LON fashion is beautifully different, outstandingly
easy-care....
BAN-LON is a trademark identifying garment, fabrics, and articles
made according to specification and quality standards prescribed
and controlled by Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co....
Unauthorized use of this tag is prohibited.
128
And on the reverse side: "A Beautiful Ban-Lon Fashion Anika New
York."
129
Plaintiff argued that Bancroft, the trademark licensor, was strictly
liable under section 400 as the apparent manufacturer of the garment.
Bancroft argued that Plaintiff could not contend that it was the appar-
ent manufacturer of the dress because the label also contained the
name of the actual manufacturer---"Anika.' °30  In so arguing, Ban-
croft relied on the language of comment (d) to section 400, which
provides that:
125 Id. at 163 (citation omitted). The Connelly court specifically rejected Uniroyal's argu-
ment that section 400 did not apply to it because the doctrine only applies to licensors who are
also a link in the chain of distribution or otherwise substantially involved in the manufacture,
design or sale of the product, and Uniroyal contended that it did not fit into this category. See id.
26 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
' 
2 Id. at 1105.
'
28 Id. at 1105-06.
'
29 Id. at 1106.
02 See id. at 1107.
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[w]here the real manufacturer is clearly and accurately identi-
fied on the label or other markings on the goods, and it is also
clearly stated that another who is also named has nothing to
do with the goods except to distribute or sell them, the latter
does not put out such goods as his own.
131
The court held that comment (d) did not relieve Bancroft of liabil-
ity under section 400, because even if Anika was the actual manu-
facturer (which was not established at trial), the label did not "clearly
state that [Bancroft] had nothing to do with the goods except to dis-
tribute or sell them."'132 The court thus took a broad view of the scope
of the apparent manufacturer doctrine and a narrow view of the ex-
ception contained in comment (d).
There is little discussion in the reported cases as to whether an in-
jured consumer must prove that she purchased the defective goods in
reliance on the reputation associated with the trademark or whether
the court may presume such reliance if a "holding out" has otherwise
been shown. While some courts have clearly required proof of indi-
vidual reliance, 133 a number of courts have allowed recovery if plain-
tiff showed that a reasonable consumer would have believed that the
licensor manufactured the goods in question.1
34
B. Limitations on the Doctrine in the Licensing Context
Despite the seemingly broad sweep of the apparent manufacturer
doctrine, only a few courts have imposed liability on a trademark li-
censor solely because its trademark or tradename appeared on a de-
fective product.135 Moreover, the doctrine has been judicially limited
131 Id. at 1107 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965)).
132 id.
133 See, e.g., Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (dismissing
Plaintiff's section 400 claim because there was no proof that the Plaintiff had relied on Defen-
dant licensor's trademark in purchasing product); In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 880 F. Supp. 1311, 1321 (D. Minn. 1995) ("[Pllaintiffs do not even contend that they be-
lieved that those defendants [the trademark licensors] were in fact the manufacturers."), a'd,
113 F.3d 1484 (8th Cir. 1997); Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134, 139-40
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) ("Caterpillar could expect others to purchase the product on reliance on
the skill and reputation associated with the Caterpillar name."). For a critical analysis of the
reliance issue in the trademark-licensing context, see infra Part IV.
'3See, e.g., Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (E.D. Pa.
1973) ("[Defendants-licensors] clearly state on their label that the article was made according to
specifications and quality standards prescribed and controlled by defendants. Thus, under Sec-
tion 400... the jury could have found defendants to be liable as a manufacturer .... ); Con-
nelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155 (111. 1979) (holding that public policy mandates that a
licensor who allows use of its trademark, particularly when the product otherwise bears no
indication it was manufactured by another entity, should be held liable as a manufacturer).
135 See, e.g., Carter, 360 F. Supp. at 1107 (holding that because the Defendant's name was
clearly stated on a defective product, the Defendant could be held liable as manufacturer); Con-
nelly, 389 N.E.2d at 163 (holding that "the [apparent manufacturer] doctrine [is] applicable to
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in the trademark licensing context in at least five important respects:
(1) the doctrine has not been recognized in every jurisdiction; (2) sev-
eral courts have limited the doctrine to "sellers," and trademark licen-
sors technically do not "sell" the licensed goods; (3) some courts have
defined the reliance element in a manner that rendered the doctrine
inapplicable to the cases at bar; (4) licensors may be immune from
liability if the name or mark of the actual manufacturer is clearly dis-
played on the defective product; and (5) some courts have required
plaintiffs to demonstrate not only that the licensor appeared to be the
manufacturer of the licensed product, but also that it was actually in-
volved in manufacturing or designing the product. These limitations
are discussed in turn below.
1. The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine Has Not Been Adopted in
Every State
First, as a threshold matter, the apparent manufacturer doctrine has
not been adopted in every state, and thus can not necessarily be used
as a basis of trademark licensor liability in such states.13 6 Indeed, in
several jurisdictions, courts or legislators have expressly declined to
adopt the doctrine. 137 As discussed more fully below, the doctrine
originated in the house-branding context and served as a means to
impose a manufacturer's liability on a retail seller, who, by placing its
name or mark on a product manufactured by another entity, held itself
out as the actual manufacturer of the product. 138 The doctrine was
then extended by some courts to include trademark licensors. 39 If a
particular state has not adopted the doctrine in the house-branding
context or has expressly rejected the doctrine in that context, how-
ever, an injured consumer may have difficulty relying on the doctrine
as a ground for licensor liability in that state.
2. The Doctrine May Not Apply to Non-Selling Licensors
Second, and perhaps most significantly, a number of courts have
held that the doctrine is limited to commercial sellers or distributors
one who, for a consideration, authorizes the use of his trademark, particularly when ... the
product bears no indication that it was manufactured by any other entity").
13 See, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 867 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1989)
(refusing to apply apparent manufacturer doctrine to Goodyear because "Arizona has not
adopted the apparent manufacturer doctrine"); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 831 F.2d
153, 155 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding parent corporation not liable for defective heaters manufac-
tured by its subsidiary because "Wisconsin has not adopted the 'apparent manufacturer' doc-
trine").
137 See Seasword v. Hilti, 537 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 1995) (expressly declining to adopt the
apparent manufacturer doctrine in Michigan).
138 See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
'
39 See supra Part 11(A).
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who hold themselves out as manufacturers, and thus the doctrine does
not apply to trademark licensors since the latter technically do not sell
or distribute the goods on which their marks appear.140  Following
this line of cases, the recently released Third Restatement of Torts
states that the apparent manufacturer doctrine does not apply to
trademark licensors under any circumstances.14 1  To fully understand
why the-new Restatement takes this position, it is necessary to review
the historical origins of the doctrine and the way in which it was
originally codified in section 400 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.' 42
As a historical matter, the apparent manufacturer doctrine devel-
oped before trademark licensing was pervasive in the United States
and before the doctrine of strict liability was applied to sellers gener-
ally. 143 Courts first applied the apparent manufacturer doctrine in the
early twentieth century to wholesale and retail sellers who placed
their own house labels on goods that had been manufactured by oth-
ers. Such sellers have been variously referred to as "house-branders"
or "house-labelers"; I shall use both terms throughout the remainder
of this Article.
Sometimes the house-brander affixed its own label to goods that
were made especially for the house-brander. 44  Other times house-
branders bought a common batch of goods that were not manufac-
tured especially for the house-brander but nevertheless labeled the
goods with the house-brander's own logos or trademarks. 145 Some-
'"See, e.g., Torres, 867 F.2d at 1236 ("The cases which apply the apparent manufacturer
doctrine demonstrate that section 400 applies only where a retailer or distributor has held itself
out to the public as the manufacturer of a product."); Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 831 F.2d at 155
(finding section 400 inapplicable to parent corporation licensor because defective product was
"put out" by parent's subsidiary, not by parent); Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d
1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that under Texas law, section 400 does not apply to a
trademark licensor who does not manufacture or market the defective product); Harmon v.
National Automotive Parts Ass'n, 720 F. Supp. 79, 81 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (applying Mississippi
law to hold that "comments to Section 400... suggest that [it] does not apply to one who is not
a seller or distributor of a product"); Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, 579 A.2d 26, 33
(Conn. 1990) (holding that apparent manufacturer doctrine does not apply where trademark
licensor was not involved in the "sale, lease, gift or loan" of the defective product).
141 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABiLrrY § 14 cmt. d (1998).
142 For an excellent summary of the history of the apparent manufacturer doctrine, see He-
bel v. Sherman Equipment, 442 N.E.2d 199, 201 (.l1. 1982).
143 The apparent manufacturer doctrine was first included in the Restatement in 1934. See
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 400 (1934) ("One who puts out as his own product a chattel
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer.").
Section 402A, which extended strict liability to retail sellers, was included in the Second Re-
statement in 1965. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965).
144 See, e.g., Degouvia v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 100 S.W.2d 336, 338 Mo. App. 1936)
(salmon packed especially for wholesaler).
145 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 164 So. 231, 232 (Miss. 1935) (holding seller of
cheese bearing seller's label, but manufactured by some third person, liable for gastric distur-
bance sustained as a result of cheese); see also Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 121 A.120
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times the house-labeler's trademark appeared next to the actual manu-
facturer's trademark;' 46 at other times the seller's mark was the only
mark on the product.147
At the time, non-manufacturing sellers were not generally subject
to liability for the defective products they sold unless they altered the
goods post-manufacture, breached an express or implied warranty, or
otherwise caused the plaintiffs injury. Against this backdrop, the
apparent manufacturer doctrine emerged as a means to impute a
manufacturer's liability to a certain subset of retail sellers. Employ-
ing common law estoppel principles, courts increasingly held that
house branders should be estopped from denying that they manufac-
tured the goods in question under certain conditions. Specifically, the
doctrine was to be applied where the presence of the house-branders'
trademarks or logos on goods was likely to lead reasonable consum-
ers to believe that the house-branders had either manufactured the
goods or specifically commissioned another entity to manufacturer
such goods.148
The rationale for the rule was two-fold. First, it was meant to
protect consumer expectations that a product made by a particular
seller was, in fact, of a quality that the consumer had come to associ-
ate with that seller. Second, it was meant to provide injured consum-
ers with a remedy against someone if the identity of the actual manu-
facturer of a defective product was not disclosed on that product or
was otherwise undiscoverable by the injured party.
Depending on which of these two rationales was seen as dominant,
courts were willing to entertain certain exceptions to the rule. In
some cases, courts exempted house-branders from liability if the
name of the actual manufacturer appeared on the defective product,
(N.J. 1935) (holding that corporation that sold can of peas under its own tr~dename liable as
apparent manufacturer).
146 See Degouvia, 100 S.W.2d at 337.
'41 See Slavin, 177 A. at 121 (finding distributor of canned peas liable where product bore
only its name and failed to state that it was not the canner of the peas); see also Burkhardt v.
Armour & Co., 161 A. 385 (Conn. 1932) (noting that canned meat bearing Defendant's trade-
mark did not indicate the identity of real packer) LIll v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 8 N.E.2d 714
(I1. App. 1937) (observing that Defendant affixed its own label to bed made by Simmons Com-
pany); Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 ll.App. 355 (1912) (noting that saw frame
manufactured by another entity bore Defendant's initials and gave no indication that it had been
made by another).
'4 See generally Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962) (holding
house-labeler Sears liable as apparent manufacturer when its "Craftsman" trademark was sole
mark on product and there was no indication of actual manufacturer); Burkhardt v. Armour &
Co., 161 A. 385 (Conn. 1932), overruled in part by Popora v. City of New Haven, 187 A. 668
(Conn. 1936).
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on the theory that the plaintiff could sue the actual manufacturer. 149
In such circumstances, courts apparently reasoned that the injured
consumer either (1) had a remedy already, (2) had no need to sue the
house-brander, or (3) in any event, could not reasonably claim that the
house-brander was the apparent manufacturer.
150
Other courts applied the same leniency toward house-branders, but
only if in addition to disclosing the name of the actual manufacturer,
the product also stated that the seller had nothing to do with the goods
other than labeling and selling them.15' These courts apparently rea-
soned that the doctrine served a greater purpose than merely protect-
ing consumers from unidentified manufacturers. In the view of these
courts, the doctrine was also designed to protect consumers' expecta-
tions that house-branded goods were likely to be somewhat better
than other goods, particularly if the consumer associated the seller's
logo with a high standard of quality.152 To protect these expectations,
courts held that a house-brander would not be immune from liability
unless the labeled goods clearly stated that the seller had nothing to
do with the goods except to label or sell them. 53  Other courts re-
fused to enforce such disclaimers and held house-branders liable even
if the identity of the actual manufacturer was disclosed and the seller
disclaimed involvement with the goods.
154
All of these strands of the doctrine converged when it was codified
in section 400 of the Second Restatement of Torts. That the doctrine
had developed in the house-branding context is evident even in the
title of section 400---"Selling as Own Product Chattel Made by An-
other." Moreover, the text of section 400 states that it applies to
"[o]ne who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by
another." 155 The official comments further provide that "[t]he words
'one who puts out a chattel' includes anyone who supplies it to others
for their own use or for the use of third persons, either by sale or
lease or by gift or loan."'156 A plausible argument can therefore be
made that section 400 is intended to apply only to entities that are
engaged in the actual physical transfer of goods. Trademark licen-
sors, of course, ordinarily do not fall into that category.
149 See, e.g., Hebel v. Sherman Equipment, 442 N.E. 2d 199, 201-03 (111. 1982) (discussing
historical evolution of the "holding out" doctrine and citing cases); see also 2 HURSH & BAILEY,
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 7:2 (2d ed. 1974) (citing cases).50 See Hebel, 442 N.E.2d 199.
151 See id.
152 See id
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965) (emphasis added).
156 Id. cmt. a (emphasis added).
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Another layer of confusion is added by comment (d) to section
400, however, which seems to suggest that the doctrine applies to
trademark licensors. Comment (d) states that a trademark owner puts
out a product as its own in two types of cases: (1) where the trade-
mark owner appears to be the actual manufacturer of the product, and
(2) where the product appears to have been made for the trademark
owner and its reputation is an assurance to the user of the quality of
the product. 157 The two identified categories would seem to apply
equally to house-branders and to trademark licensors. On the other
hand, any inference that the doctrine is intended to apply to trademark
licensors seems to be negated by the language of comment a, which
mentions only the "sale... lease ... gift or loan" transactions.' 5
The inherent ambiguity of section 400 led courts to take divergent
views as to whether the doctrine could apply to trademark licensors.
As we have seen, some courts held the doctrine inapplicable to
trademark licensors on the grounds that section 400 applies only to
entities who (unlike trademark licensors) "sell, lease, give or loan"
products.15 9 Other courts essentially ignored the comments to section
400, or have at least found them inconclusive and non-controlling in
the trademark-licensing context, and applied the doctrine to trademark
licensors who held themselves out as apparent manufacturers of de-
fective goods.160 Courts adopting this view took the position that,
given the underlying rationale of the doctrine as it had evolved in the
house-branding context, it should apply with equal force in the trade-
mark-licensing context.
1 61
For example, in Brandimarti, discussed above,162 the court prem-
ised Caterpillar's liability on the sole fact that "Caterpillar could ex-
pect others to purchase the product in reliance on the skill and reputa-
tion associated with the Caterpillar name." 163 Similarly, in Connelly,
also discussed above,164 the Illinois Supreme Court expressly rejected
Uniroyal's argument that section 400 only applies to entities that also
sell or distribute the goods in question. Finding that there was no rea-
son why the doctrine should not apply in the licensing context, the
157 See id. cmt. d.
"" Id cmL. a.
159 See supra note 140; see also Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1222-24 (10th
Cir. 1997) (finding that even assuming Colorado law would recognize the apparent manufac-
turer doctrine, it did not apply here because Honeywell did not sell or distribute the allegedly
defective keyboards bearing its mark).160 See supra Part 11(A).
.61 See iu.
162 See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
16 Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134, 139-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
164 See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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court held that the doctrine applies to all trademark licensors, regard-
less of whether they also sell or distribute the goods in question.
165
The new Restatement rejects this line of authority and squarely
aligns itself with those cases that have held the doctrine inapplicable
to trademark licensors. 166 Section 14, which sets forth the new Re-
statement's version of the doctrine, rewords section 400 of the Second
Restatement to make it clear that the doctrine applies only to product
sellers or distributors who place their own marks or names on the
products they sell. 167 Specifically, Section 14 states that:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distrib-
uting products who sells or distributes as its own a product
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as
though the seller or distributor were the product's manufac-
turer.
168
Comment (d) to Section 14 expressly states that the doctrine does not
apply to trademark licensors:
The rule stated in this Section does not, by its terms, apply
to the owner of a trademark who licenses a manufacturer to
place the licensor's trademark or logo on the manufacturer's
product and distribute it as though manufactured by the licen-
sor. In such a case.., the licensor does not "sell or distrib-
ute as its own a product manufactured by another." Thus,
the manufacturer may be liable [under the Sections that apply
to manufacturer liability], but the licensor, who does not sell
or otherwise distribute products, is not liable under this Sec-
tion of this Restatement.
169
165 See Connelly v. Uniroyal Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 163 (Ill. 1979). The court in Connelly
applied a hybrid analysis combining both section 400 and section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. It held that trademark licensors are per se integral links in the manufactur-
ing process and thus should be held strictly liable. The court asserted that the societal purposes
underlying imposing strict liability on one who holds himself out as manufacturer under section
400 mandated application of the doctrine to a trademark licensor, particularly where the product
in question bears no indication that it was manufactured by any other entity. See id. at 163. It
added that the fact that licensor was not a link in the chain of distribution was wholly irrelevant.
See id.
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABLiTY § 14 (1998).
167 See id.
168 Id. (emphasis added).
16 9 Id. cmt. d (emphasis added). The comment further asserts that "[t]rademark licensors are
liable for harm caused by defective products distributed under the licensor's trademark or logo
when they participate substantially in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the licensee's
products. In these circumstances they are treated as sellers of the products bearing their trade-
marks." Id. The latter reference apparently refers to the line of cases applying the so-called
"enterprise liability" theory to trademark licensors.
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In excluding trademark licensors from the ambit of section 14, the
new Restatement appears to give little consideration to whether cases
following a contrary approach were rightly decided as a matter of
logic and public policy. The Restatement appears to ground this po-
sition primarily in the wording of section 400 and in the fact that the
doctrine originated in the house-branding context.
3. Failing to Show the Requisite Reliance
While a number of courts have held that the apparent manufacturer
doctrine might theoretically apply to a trademark licensor, they have
sometimes found the doctrine inapplicable because the plaintiff failed
to show the requisite reliance on the licensor's mark. For example, in
Hebel v. Sher~nan Equipment,17° the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
find a trademark licensor liable under section 400 because the pres-
ence of its mark on the product at issue would not have lead a reason-
able purchaser of the product-as opposed to an casual observer-to
believe that the licensor manufactured or vouched for the product.
171
In Hebel, the Plaintiff was injured when his foot was caught in a
conveyor belt attached to an automatic car washing system.1 72 The
system, except for the allegedly defective conveyor, was manufac-
tured by the Sherman Equipment Company ("Sherman"), and bore the
"Sherman" tradename. 173 The conveyor was manufactured by another
entity and was not labeled with any name or mark. 74 The Illinois
appellate court held Sherman strictly liable under the apparent manu-
facturer doctrine, finding that a "reasonable person in plaintiff's posi-
tion would view the entire... car wash as one 'system' and would
infer that Sherman manufactured all of its 'component parts,' includ-
ing the conveyor.' 175
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning as follows:
The primary rationale for imposing liability on the apparent
manufacturer of a defective product is that it has induced the
purchasing public to believe that it is the actual manufacturer,
and to act on this belief-that is, to purchase the product in
reliance on the apparent manufacturer's reputation and skill in
making it .... It is thus apparent that whether a holding out
has occurred must be judged from the viewpoint of the pur-
chasing public, and in light of the circumstances as of the
170 442 N.E.2d 199 (Ill. 1982).
171 See id. at 203.
' See i& at 200.
173 See d  at 200-01.
174 See id at 201.
'75 Id. at 203.
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time of purchase .... That a casual observer, viewing the
[car-washing] machines after their purchase and installation,
might think [that Sherman manufactured the entire assem-
blage] does not mean that the reasonable purchaser of car-
washing equipment, such as Glenbrook, would rely on such
an impression.
76
Hebel is a significant case because it holds that whether a holding out
has occurred must be judged from the viewpoint of the informed pur-
chaser of the product in question, not from the viewpoint of a casual
observer. 177
Similarly, in In Re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation,
178
the court refused to hold a trademark licensor liable as an apparent
manufacturer because, inter alia, (1) the trademark that appeared on
the product was not a registered mark of the licensor, and (2) the
Plaintiffs did not even allege that they relied on the reputation of the
licensor in making their purchase decisions. The jaw implants at issue
in the case were manufactured by Dow Coming, which was fifty per-
cent owned by Dow Chemical and fifty percent owned by Coming,
Inc., two separate corporations.179 The implants were sold in boxes
bearing Dow Corning's registered trademarks, "Dow Coming" and
"Silastic." Plaintiffs claimed that Dow Chemical, the stockholder
company, should be held vicariously liable for alleged implant defects
due to the presence of the "Dow" name as a part of the "Dow Com-
ing" company name.18°
The court rejected these arguments finding, inter alia, that "the
name 'Dow Coming' is a combination of two trade names owned
by Dow Chemical and Coming," and the combined name "Dow
Coming" is "a trademark owned by Dow Coming, not by Dow
Chemical or Coming."18' The court further noted that "the plain-
tiffs do not even contend that they believed that those defendants
were in fact the manufacturers" of their jaw implants. 82 The court
thus found that the apparent manufacturer doctrine simply did not
apply because Dow Chemical, the trademark licensor, had not held
itself out as a manufacturer of silicone implants, and because the
176 Id.
17 But see E.L duPont Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1969) (sug-
gesting that it was for the jury to decide whether a "casual" purchaser might be deceived into
believing that duPont was the manufacturer of the end product).
178 880 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1995), af'd, 113 F.3d 1484 (8th Cir. 1996).
179 See id. at 1321.
180 See id.
1811d.
182 Id.
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Plaintiffs did not even contend that they (or their plastic surgeons)
relied on any such holding out in purchasing the allegedly defec-
tive implants.183
4. Requiring Licensor Involvement in the Manufacturing or
Design Process
A few courts have refused to extend the apparent manufacturer
doctrine to trademark licensors who were not involved in manufac-
turing or designing their licensees' goods. For example, in Burkert v.
Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc.,184 the court refused to apply the ap-
parent manufacturer doctrine to a trademark licensor because, inter
alia, the licensor (1) did not sell or distribute the defective product in
question; (2) was not involved at all in the manufacturing or design
process; and (3) did not induce consumers to believe it made the
product, where the identity of the actual manufacturer also appeared
on the goods and the Plaintiffs did not allege that they relied on the
reputation of the licensor when making their purchases. 185 In Burk-
ert, buyers of allegedly defective automatic transmission fluid sued
General Motors (GM), the trademark licensor whose registered
trademark "Dextron IT' appeared on the fluid containers. 86 GM re-
ceived no financial benefit from the licensing agreement. 187  GM is-
sued performance standards, however, which its licensees were re-
quired to meet, and had their compliance checked by an independent
laboratory.188 Aside from this, GM had no involvement with the al-
legedly defective product.
1 89
The court recognized that a non-manufacturer could be held li-
able for a defective product as an apparent manufacturer pursuant to
section 400, where the non-manufacturer "put out" a product and sold
it as its own.190 However, after reviewing relevant case law, the court
held that liability could not be extended to a trademark licensor under
section 400 unless the licensor had played a significant role in the
18 See id. (citing Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding that where product does not bear the defendant's name, section 400 does not apply)).
'"4 579 A.2d 26 (Conn. 1990); see also Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1454, 1462-64
(2d Cir. 1995) (finding licensor not liable because, inter alia, Plaintiffs submitted no evidence of
licensor's actual participation in the manufacturing process); Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 900 F.
Supp. 240, 245, 246 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding no liability for trademark owner because no evi-
dence that it provided specifications for the product or exercised significant control over the
product's production).
'85 See id. at 33-34.
16 See id at 28.
'" See i& at 29.
"8 See id.
'89 See id. at 28.
'9o See id. at 33.
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production, marketing or chain of distribution of the defective prod-
uct. Some examples would include receiving royalties, supplying the
licensee with critical personnel and equipment, or actively advertising
the product. 191
Burkert is a somewhat unusual case because of the degree to
which it blurs the distinction between the apparent manufacturer doc-
trine and the stream of commerce or enterprise liability theory. The
latter theory holds that a trademark licensor may be held vicariously
liable for the torts of its licensee if the licensor is a "significant par-
ticipant" in the overall enterprise that places a defective product into
the stream of commerce. 192 The theory thus focuses almost entirely
on the licensor's control over, or involvement in, its licensee's af-
fairs. 193 Indeed, the Burkert court erroneously suggests that "[t]he
analysis underlying [the stream of commerce] theory does not differ
in any significant way from the apparent manufacturer doctrine.'
194
To the contrary, the apparent manufacturer doctrine as applied by the
majority of courts, does not require a showing of licensor control or
involvement in its licensees affairs.
195
5. No Liability if Identity of Actual Manufacturer Is Disclosed
Finally, as discussed earlier,196 a number of courts have refused to
extend the apparent manufacturer doctrine to trademark owners if
their goods clearly identified the identity of the actual manufacturer
and clearly stated that the trademark owner had nothing to do with the
goods other than to sell and label them. 97 The logic of this limitation
is that when the actual manufacturer's name or mark is clearly dis-
played on the goods, and the trademark owner disclaims any in-
volvement with the goods other than to sell them, the trademark
owner has not implicitly represented, and consumers have not been
lead to believe, that the trademark owner manufactured the goods.198
The Second Restatement officially endorsed this position in comment
(d) to section 400.199
19' See id. at 35.
192 For a more thorough discussion of enterprise liability theory, see Franklyn, supra note
8, at 20.
193 See id.
'
94 Burkert, 579 A.2d at 33 n.11.
195 See supra Part III(A) and (B)(1)-(4).
196 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
197 See, e.g., Holman Motor Co. v. Evans, 314 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
a trademark licensor is not liable as apparent manufacturer where the identity of actual manu-
facturer was disclosed).
193 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965).
199 See id ("Where the real manufacturer or packer is clearly and accurately identified on
the label or other markings on the goods, and it is also clearly stated that another who is also
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However, because section 400 was designed with house-branders
in mind, it does not always translate smoothly into the trademark-
licensing context. In Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co.,200 for
example, the court held the licensor liable as an apparent manufac-
turer even though the name of the actual manufacturer was displayed
on the goods. 201 The court noted that the goods did not contain an
explicit disclaimer (as required by section 400) that the licensor had
nothing to do with the goods other than to sell or label them.202 Of
course, a licensor ordinarily can not make such a disclaimer because
(1) it did not sell or label the licensed goods, and (2) it can not say "it
had nothing to do with the goods" given its (albeit amorphous) quality
control obligations under the Lanham Act.203
In fact, while the new Restatement takes an extremely narrow
view of the doctrine in the trademark-licensing context, it takes a
broad view of the doctrine in the house-branding context. The new
Restatement states that the house-brander is not relieved of liability as
an apparent manufacturer even when the identity of the true manu-
facturer is clearly disclosed.204 The new Restatement reasons that
liability should be imposed on the house-labeler because even in these
circumstances, consumers purchase the house-branded products rely-
ing, in part, on the good reputation of the trademark owner.20 5 Thus,
the official comments state:
Representing oneself as the manufacturer or one for whom
the product has been specially manufactured. When a com-
mercial seller sells a product manufactured by another under
its own trademark or logo, the seller is liable as though it was
the manufacturer of the product. This rule applies even if the
seller discloses that the product was produced by an identi-
fied manufacturer specifically for the seller. In this circum-
stance, the seller is presumed to cause the product to be used
or consumed, in part at least, in reliance on the seller. The
seller's reputation is an implied assurance of the quality of the
product, and the seller should be estopped from denying that
it stands behind that assurance.0 6
named has nothing to do with the goods except to distribute or sell them, the latter does not put
out such goods as his own. That the goods are not the product of him who puts them out may
also be indicated clearly in other ways.") (emphasis added).
200 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
201 see id.
2 See id. at 1107.
203 See supra Part II(D)(3).
204 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrs LLAIrrY § 14 (1998).
205 See id. cmt. c.
m6 Id. (emphasis added).
1999]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The new Restatement's position is perplexing and seems at odds
with its position that the doctrine does not apply to trademark licen-
sors. Indeed, if the mere presence of a seller's trademark on a product
necessarily is such a strong "implied assurance of the quality of the
product" that the trademark owner is estopped from denying that it
"stands behind that assurance," it would seem that all trademark own-
ers, including trademark licensors, should be subject to liability under
the apparent manufacturer doctrine.
IV. A CRmTICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE APPARENT MANUFACTURER
DOCTRINE IN THE TRADEMARK-LICENSING CONTEXT AND A
PROPOSED APPROACH
This section first identifies the policy reasons for and against ap-
plying the apparent manufacturer doctrine to trademark licensors. It
then argues that the apparent manufacturer doctrine should apply to
trademark licensors in two situations: (1) when the licensor appears
to be the manufacturer of the licensed product, and (2) when the li-
censor appears to have supplied the specifications and standards for
making the licensed product. Next, this section discusses the ways in
which the proposed test would apply to different types of licensing
arrangements. It then argues that in applying the proposed test, courts
should use both an objective and a subjective standard to determine
proof of reliance, and that licensors should be permitted to negate any
inference of manufacturer status through the use of appropriate writ-
ten disclaimers. Finally, it contends that licensors should be afforded
a safe harbor from liability when they demonstrate that the actual
manufacturer of the licensed goods is jurisdictionally available and
capable of satisfying a likely judgment against it.
A. Justifications for Extending the Apparent Manufacturer
Doctrine to Trademark Licensors
In those cases in which courts have applied the apparent manu-
facturer doctrine to trademark licensors, the licensors were subjected
to the same standard of liability-i.e., negligenc'e or strict liability-
that would have applied to actual manufacturers under applicable
state law.207 This seems logical, given the principle articulated in
section 400 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts-which provides
that one who "puts out a chattel as his own" is liable as if it were the
manufacturer of those goods 2° 8-and the official comments to the
Second Restatement, which state that one puts out goods as one's
own if one affixes one's own label or trademark to goods.20 9 Based
207 See supra notes 112-30 (citing cases).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965).
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affixes one's own label or trademark to goods.20 9 Based on the lan-
guage in these provisions, several courts have applied the doctrine to
hold a trademark licensor strictly liable.210 However, the Third Re-
statement takes a contrary view. Indeed, the new Restatement's sec-
tion 14 is clear that the doctrine applies only to entities that engage in
the physical transfer of goods, i.e., sellers, lessors, etc.211 Further-
more, comment d to section 14 expressly states that trademark licen-
sors are exempted from the rule.
212
However, when one considers the logical underpinnings of the
doctrine, there are compelling reasons for extending it to trademark
licensors. Indeed, the apparent manufacturer doctrine should apply to
trademark licensors for precisely the same reasons that it was first
applied to house-branders. In each situation, the consumer is led to
believe (erroneously) that the goods were manufactured by the entity
whose trademark appears on the goods. In each situation, the con-
sumer purchases the goods because she has confidence in the brand
name. Thus, it would appear that a "holding out" has occurred in
each situation in precisely the same way and to the same extent.
There are at least four reasons why the apparent manufacturer
doctrine should be applied to trademark licensors in appropriate cir-
cumstances. First, society has an interest in holding trademark licen-
sors accountable when they profit from the implied representation that
they manufactured, or controlled the manufacture, of their licensees'
goods. Quite apart from whether consumers actually rely on such
implied representations it is reasonable to assure that, trademark li-
censors may attempt to induce and profit from such reliance. Licen-
sors should be held accountable for the "losses" as well as the "prof-
its" that may result from such reliance.
Second, tort law should protect consumers' reasonable expecta-
tions. If a consumer purchases product X because she believes it was
made by company X, and because she trusts company X, it would
seem unjust to hold that she could not recover from company X if the
product is defective and injures her. The case for imposing liability
on company X is especially strong where company X has knowingly
and intentionally induced the consumer to detrimentally rely on com-
pany X's brand name or trademark. In such circumstances, it seems
unfair to preclude a consumer from recovering a judgement from
company X.
209 See id.
210 See supra Part f1(A).
211 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14 (1998).
212 See i&4 cmt. d ("One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who sells or distributes as its own a product manufactured by another is subject to the same
liability as though the seller or distributor were the products manufacturer.").
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Third, if the licensor's mark is the only mark appearing on a prod-
uct, and if the plaintiff is unable to discover the identity of the true
manufacturer (perhaps due to the existence of several different licen-
sees), it seems fair to hold the licensor liable in lieu of the actual
manufacturer. As between the plaintiff and the licensor, the latter is
in a better position to ensure that the licensed goods are properly la-
beled, or to identify the responsible licensee. In these circumstances,
the apparent manufacture doctrine (1) provides incentives for the li-
censor to insist on adequate manufacturer identification, and (2) en-
sures that an injured consumer has at least one potential source of
compensation when the identity of the actual manufacturer is un-
known.
Fourth, subjecting licensors to potential liability under the appar-
ent manufacturer doctrine would provide licensors with additional
incentives to eliminate the unsafe character of their licensees' goods.
If properly circumscribed, the apparent manufacturer doctrine should
apply only to trademark licensors who have the requisite knowledge
and experience to make a meaningful contribution to their licensees'
safety assurance efforts at relatively low cost to the licensors. It is
desirable to construct tort rules that maximize the production of safe
products and that encourage all actors, including licensors, to strive
for enhanced product safety.
Against these reasons, one must weigh the reasons against ex-
tending the doctrine to trademark licensors. Four main arguments
may be articulated. First, it might be argued that the two situations
are materially different because in the house-branding situation the
entity that does the "holding out" is a seller, whereas in the licensing
situation the entity that does the "holding out" is not a seller. Put an-
other way, house-branders are in a transactional relationship with
consumers; licensors are not. It could be argued that the house-
brander is held liable not only because it has erroneously induced
consumers to believe that it manufactured the goods, but also because
it is a seller who has misled consumers in this way.
This argument is unpersuasive. The house-brander's status as a
seller appears to play little, if any, role in the decision to hold it liable
under the apparent manufacturer doctrine. To the contrary, the house-
brander is held liable primarily because it induces consumers to be-
lieve that it manufactured the goods on which its marks appear, not
because it is a seller that has induced such reliance.213 Accordingly,
there is no reason not to apply the doctrine to a trademark licensor
213 See, e.g., Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199, 201-03 (111. 1982) (citing cases and
holding that same rationale for holding house-branders liable as apparent manufacturer doctrine
applies to non-selling trademark licensors).
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who engages in the same type of implied misrepresentation. The only
difference is that the house-branding seller itself makes the implied
misrepresentation, whereas the licensor authorizes another entity (the
licensee) to make such a misrepresentation. But this difference is not
sufficient ground for exempting trademark licensors from the appli-
cation of the doctrine.
Second, as noted earlier, one of the primary purposes of the appar-
ent manufacturer doctrine was to provide consumers with a remedy
where the identity of the true manufacturer was unknown to the
plaintiff and presumably known to the house-branding seller 14 In-
deed, some courts have held that the apparent manufacturer doctrine
is inapplicable if the identity of the actual manufacturer is known or
discoverable.21 5 But in the licensing context, consumers frequently
attempt to hold licensors liable under the apparent manufacturer doc-
trine even though the plaintiff knows the identity of the actual manu-
facturer. It could therefore be argued that the doctrine would not ful-
fill its essential purpose if it were applied in such cases.
This argument is likewise unpersuasive. Providing injured con-
sumers with a source of compensation was only one of the reasons for
subjecting house-branders to liability as apparent manufacturers. The
primary reason for the doctrine was to preclude trademark owners
from denying manufacturer status when they knowingly profited from
implicitly representing themselves as manufacturers.216 Thus, a
strong argument exists that the doctrine ought to apply regardless of
whether the actual manufacturer is disclosed or discoverable.
Third, it could be argued that applying the apparent manufacturer
doctrine to licensors would greatly (and undesirably) expand the
number of persons or entities that are subject to strict liability and, as
a result, the number of persons who must insure against product li-
ability risks. Given the escalating costs of strict liability insurance,
this is a valid concern. Licensors might be required to purchase addi-
tional liability insurance and, in turn, might pass on these increased
expenses to their licensees through increased royalty rates. Licensees,
for their part, might then pass on their increased costs to consumers
through increased prices.
214 See id at 201-02 (citing cases); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., Holman Motor Co. v. Evans, 314 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. App. 1984) (finding no li-
ability for apparent manufacturer where identity of actual manufacturer is known or discover-
able).
216 See, e.g., Hebel, 442 N.E.2d at 201.
217 In addition, the specter of expanded liability could discourage business entities from en-
gaging in trademark licensing. To the extent that licensing stimulates the economy and leads to
a greater diversification of goods, this might be undesirable. Given the fact that other entities in
the chain of distribution (i.e., manufacturers, sellers, distributors) already insure against these
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However, all product liability laws potentially have the effect of
increasing the costs of consumer goods. In addition, as I demonstrate
infra,218 the concern with unnecessarily increasing litigation fees and
insurance costs can be addressed by creating a "safe harbor" for licen-
sors who demonstrate that the true manufacturer is jurisdictionally
available and solvent.
Fourth, it could be argued that it is preferable to hinge liability
on whether a licensor has controlled its licensees' operations, rather
than on whether consumers purchased a particular product in reliance
on the trademark owner's reputation. Imagining what a reasonable
consumer would believe about a particular trademark is a highly
speculative undertaking. Furthermore, a consumer's testimony about
her reliance on the licensor's mark is likely to be subjective, unverifi-
able and self-serving. For these reasons, courts may prefer to ground
licensor liability on control-based theories, or at least on a theory that
considers both control and reliance as important factors. 19
This too is a valid concern, but it likewise may be addressed
without holding that the apparent manufacturer doctrine does not ap-
ply to licensors under any circumstances. To the contrary, as I show
infra, society's interest in ensuring an efficient tort system can be
achieved by carefully circumscribing the circumstances under which
licensors are subject to liability under the apparent manufacturer doc-
trine.
The central contention of this Article is that an optimal balance of
these competing concerns can be achieved by subjecting trademark
licensors to liability under a carefully circumscribed version of the
apparent manufacturer doctrine. Specifically, the apparent manufac-
turer doctrine should apply to trademark licensors in only two situa-
tions: 220  (1) when a licensor induces consumers to believe the licen-
same risks, it is doubtful whether the benefits of requiring licensors to provide an additional
layer of insurance are worth the costs.
218 See infra Part IY(E).
219 See Franidyn, supra note 8 at 20-30 (discussing courts' reliance on evidence of licen-
sor's actual control and consumer perceptions of trademark in assessing licensor's potential
liability under the stream of commerce theory). Indeed, courts have shown far more willingness
to hold trademark licensors liable under the "enterprise" theory of liability than under the appar-
ent manufacture doctrine. See Franldyn, supra note 8 at 20-30 (discussing cases). The enter-
prise theory is typically based on findings that a licensor controlled its licensee's operations and
that the plaintiff relied on the licensor's trademark as an indicia of quality at the time she pur-
chased the product in question. See id. at 21.
220 The test proposed here is consistent with the control-based tests I advanced in my earlier
article on licensor liability. There, I argued that a trademark licensor should be held vicariously
liable for defective products produced by its licensees if the licensor is the functional equivalent
of a manufacturer. See Franldyn, supra note 8, at 49-57. The primary test used there for deter-
mining if a licensor is the functional equivalent of a manufacturer is whether the licensor pro-
vided specifications and standards for manufacturing the defective goods. See id. at 49-50. Un-
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sor manufactured the product, or (2) when a licensor induces consum-
ers to believe that the licensor controlled the standards or specifica-
tions for manufacturing the product.22' Under either prong of the
proposed test, however, a plaintiff should be required to show both
that she actually relied on one of these implied representations, and
that her reliance was reasonable and justified in the circumstances. A
plaintiff would be permitted to make this showing by demonstrating
that a reasonable consumer of the licensed product would have relied
on the trademark in the requisite manner. Once the plaintiff made this
showing, courts would then presume that the actual consumer of the
product at issue in fact so relied. However, trademark licensors
would be permitted to rebut this presumption, and defeat liability, by
showing that the actual consumer did not, in fact, so rely. Finally,
trademark licensors would be absolved of liability if they could dem-
onstrate that the actual manufacturer is jurisdictionally available and
able to satisfy a likely judgment against it.
The proposed approach validates society's interest in holding li-
censors accountable for implicitly vouching for the safety of their li-
censees' goods. It protects consumers who detrimentally rely on
trademarks as substitutes for in-depth personal investigation into the
safety and quality of goods. It preserves a causal connection between
the licensor's holding out and the plaintiff's injuries by requiring
proof of actual and justifiable reliance. And it minimizes unnecessary
litigation and insurance costs (while still ensuring an adequate source
of compensation) by immunizing licensors who demonstrate that the
actual manufacturer is solvent and subject to personal jurisdiction in
states where the product was sold.
B. Applying the Proposed Test to Different Types of Licensors
This Article also considers the ways in which the proposed tests
are likely to apply in practice. Whether a particular licensor is likely
der the test proposed here, a trademark licensor would be subject to imputed liability based on
the appearance of its control over its licensees if, and only if, the licensor would be subject to
such liability if it in fact had exercised such control over its licensees. In short, if a trademark
licensor who actually functions as a manufacturer is vicariously liable for its licensees' goods,
then liability should similarly attach to any licensor who appears to function as a manufacturer
of those goods. The consumer reliance test proposed in the present Article is thus symmetrical
with the control-based test advanced in the earlier article.
221 Given the fact that modem trademark licensing is allowed only if the licensor "controls
the quality" of the licensed goods, it could be argued that all trademarks implicitly represent that
the trademark owner is the "functional equivalent" of a manufacturer and therefore liable under
the proposed test. However, as I demonstrate infra, it is highly doubtful that the quality control
requirement requires licensors to provide standards and specifications for manufacturing a prod-
uct or otherwise to assure product safety. See infra Part IV(B) and (C). Moreover, consumers
clearly do not assume that licensors fulfill such a role in all licensing situations. See id.
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to be held liable under these tests depends on a number of factors,
including: (1) the nature of the licensing arrangement at issue, (2)
whether the licensee's own trademark or tradename appeared on the
product that gave rise to the plaintiff's injury, (3) whether the licensor
was licensing in an industry that consumers normally associated with
other goods made by the licensor, and (4) whether the product con-
tained a label expressly stating that the licensor did not make nor
dictated the standards or specifications for making the licensed goods.
The type of licensing arrangement that exists between a licensor
and its licensee is an especially important factor in assessing liability
under the proposed test. This is so because the nature of the arrange-
ment will frequently determine the way in which the licensed goods
are labelled and thus determine consumer perceptions regarding the
trademark and the role of the trademark licensor. It is useful to view
licensing arrangements as falling into one of four principal categories:
(1) classical licensing, (2) franchising, (3) collateral licensing, and (4)
promotional licensing.222 As a general matter, classical and franchise
licensors are more likely than collateral and promotional licensors to
be subjected to liability under the proposed test than collateral and
promotional licensors. An understanding of the differences between
each type of licensing will help explain why this is so.
In classical licensing, a company that previously manufactured a
particular product and established consumer identification with its
trademarks in association with that product, essentially "outsources"
the manufacturing of the product to a trademark licensee. In such
situations, the licensor is generally knowledgeable about the manu-
facturing process and thus provides its licensees with product stan-
dards and specifications. An example of classical licensing would be
when Serta licenses its trademarks to independent mattress manufac-
turers. In classical licensing situations, the name of the licensee usu-
ally is not displayed on the licensed product. The apparent manufac-
turer doctrine would seem especially applicable in such circum-
stances, since consumers are likely to believe that Serta either made,
or dictated the standards for making, the mattresses bearing its marks.
In franchise licensing, the licensor licenses its marks to a number
of franchisors who then assemble and sell products bearing those
goods to the public. Some of the more prominent examples of such
222 Commentators have identified as many as twelve categories of trademark licensing, but,
for the most part, these attempts at categorization have focused on the type of product or indus-
try in which licensing occurs. See, e.g., JACK REVOYR, A PRIMER ON LICENSING 23-37 (2d ed.
1995) (listing twelve types of licensing, including designer brand, character, celebrity, corpo-
rate, entertainment, cultural, event, association, "cause," destination, sports and collegiate li-
censing).
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licensing include Kentucky Fried Chicken, McDonald's and Wendy's.
Here, trademark licensors are likely to be liable under the proposed
test, not because they appear to be the "manufacturers" of a given
product, but rather because they appear to be the "functional equiva-
lent" of manufacturers. That is, consumers may reasonably assume
that the franchisor controls the standards and specifications for mak-
ing the franchised goods.22
A third type of licensing is "collateral product licensing." In this
type of licensing, a well-known manufacturer in one industry may
decide to expand to another industry and to produce goods in the sec-
ondary industry through a trademark licensee. An example of collat-
eral licensing would be if General Motors (GM) licensed its marks to
"Mats Plus," a floor mat company, for the sole purpose of making
floor mats for GM cars. If the trademarks of both companies ap-
peared on the floor mats, it is not clear whether GM would be held
liable as an apparent manufacturer. On one hand, because floor mats
are closely related to the automobile manufacturing indsutry in which
GM first established consumer identification with its marks, consum-
ers may reasonably conclude that Mats Plus made the floor mats at
GM's request and pursuant to GM's specifications. However, the
justification for licensor liability decreases proportionally as the de-
gree of collateralness increases. That is, when the industry in which
the licensor is licensing is far removed from the industry in which it
first established the reputation of its marks, consumers will be hard-
pressed to argue that they believed the licensor made or dictated the
standards for making the licensed goods.
A fourth type of licensing, which may be categorized as a subset
of collateral licensing, is promotional licensing. In this type of li-
censing, the owner of an established trademark licenses its mark to a
manufacturer primarily for the purpose of promoting the product.
Examples of promotional licensing include Michael Jordan licensing
the Jordan mark to Nike for use on Air Jordan Nike gym shoes, Coca-
Cola licensing the Coke mark to a clothing manufacturer for use on
Coke pants or to a toy manufacturer for use on Coke teddy bears.
Because it ordinarily would not be reasonable for consumers to as-
sume that the trademark licensors in these examples made or dictated
the standards for making these products, it is doubtful that the licen-
sors would be liable under the test proposed here.
223 Franchising is not the primary focus of this Article. For a number of reasons, the fran-
chisor's relationship with its franchisees may be more extensive than that of a non-franchising
licensor. For a more thorough discussion of franchisor liability, see, for example, John W.
Behringer & Monica A. Otte, Liability and the Trademark Licensor: Advice for the Franchisor
of Goods and Services, 19 AM. Bus. LJ. 109 (1981).
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The main problem in applying the proposed test to concrete cases
is in deciding what a trademark's presence on goods "represents" or
"conveys" in that case. Sometimes a trademark will convey the im-
pression that the trademark owner made the goods. Other times the
identity of the actual manufacturer will be clearly displayed and the
trademark may convey the impression that the trademark owner
merely "promotes" or "endorses" the goods. In other situations, it
may be unclear what message a trademark conveys.
A series of illustrations might be helpful. Suppose that General
Motors was to license its "GM" and "Chevrolet" trademarks to the
Kentucky Car Company, which, in turn, manufactured cars bearing
only the GM and Chevrolet trademarks. To the vast majority of con-
sumers, GM clearly would appear to be the manufacturer. This is so
because American consumers have come to associate GM's marks
with cars manufactured by General Motors. GM's trademarks ap-
pearing as the only marks on cars clearly would function as indicators
of the manufacturing source of the cars-albeit as misleading ones in
this case. Few would question a judicial finding that GM was an ap-
parent manufacturer in these circumstances.
For a slightly harder case, assume the same facts, except that in
addition to GM's trademarks, the cars bear the trademark "Kentucky
Car Company." The words "Kentucky Car Company" would suggest
to reasonable observers that the company had something to do with
the cars, but probably would not defeat the impression that GM
manufactured them or, at least, that the cars were manufactured ac-
cording to GM's specifications and standards. This is so because
GM's marks are so intensely associated in the public mind with cars.
The mere presence of an additional name on GM cars is not likely to
dispel the perception that the cars were made by, or especially for,
GM. Thus, in the hypothetical situation, GM would still be liable as
an apparent manufacturer.
Thus far we have considered the application of the apparent manu-
facturer doctrine primarily in the classical licensing context, and we
have found that absent a clear and unequivocal disclaimer, the doc-
trine probably would apply. Next, the doctrine should be considered
in the collateral and promotional licensing contexts. Absent a dis-
claimer to the contrary in the floor mat hypothetical discussed above,
consumers might suppose that the floor mats were made according to
GM's standards or specifications. However, as one moves into more
collateral markets, the perception that the licensor manufactured the
goods becomes less plausible. This is especially so if the goods also
bear the name of a company that is widely associated as the actual
manufacturer of the same type of goods. For example, if GM's marks
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appeared on Macintosh Computers, most consumers would assume
that Macintosh manufactured the computers because Macintosh
makes computers. They may be confused as to why GM's marks ap-
pear on the goods and would probably assume that GM had some-
thing to do with the goods and profited from them. However, they are
unlikely to assume that GM was the manufacturer or that the goods
were necessarily made according to GM's specifications.
The apparent manufacturer doctrine seems even less appropriate in
the promotional licensing context. There, it is usually clear that the
trademark serves a purely promotional purpose and does not signify
the identity of the manufacturer of the goods or a source of standards
or specifications. For example, few people assume that the National
Football League (NFL) actually manufactures baseball caps bearing
the NFL logo or that those caps are made according to NFL specifi-
cations and standards. Similarly, consumers probably do not assume
that Coke manufactures Levi's jeans that bear the Coke logo on their
back pockets. In these cases, trademarks plainly do serve a promo-
tional function by stimulating sales. Yet, the trademark owner proba-
bly should not be liable as an apparent manufacturer, because con-
sumers have not purchased the goods in reliance on a belief that the
promotional licensor made the goods or specified the standards by
which they were made.
This view is consistent with comment (d) to section 400 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, which provides that the apparent manu-
facturer doctrine applies to trademark owners in two types of cases:
(1) where the trademark owner appears to be the actual manufacturer
of a product, and (2) where the product appears to have been made
especiallyfor the trademark owner and its reputation is an assurance
to the user of the quality of the product.224 In the dual-mark situa-
tion, the presence of the licensor's mark alongside the manufac-
turer/licensee's independent mark may convey the impression that the
product was made especially for the licensor and according to the li-
censor's specifications and standards. If so, it seems sensible to hold
the licensor vicariously liable as an apparent manufacturer. However,
where the presence of the secondary mark does not convey such an
impression, it seems unwarranted to impose liability on a trademark
licensor.
Since the second prong of comment d represents a significant ex-
pansion of the class of licensors to which the apparent manufacturer
doctrine applies, it is important to describe its boundaries more pre-
cisely. Such precision may be achieved by contrasting the application
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965) (emphasis added).
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of section 400 to house-branders with its application to trademark
licensors. In the house-branding situation, section 400 imposes vi-
carious liability on the house-labeling seller if the presence of the
seller's trademark would lead a reasonable consumer to believe the
goods in question were made especially for the house-brander.22
This formulation of the rule makes sense in the house-branding situa-
tion because house-branders commission independent manufacturers
to make products especially for them. For example, a national su-
permarket might commission a large canning company to can peas for
the supermarket. Once the peas are canned, the supermarket may af-
fix to the cans its own house label. In such circumstances, the house
brand will likely be the only trademark on the can of peas. Of course,
there may be fine print stating that a separate company canned the
peas for the supermarket chain. In these circumstances, it may make
sense to premise the house-brander's vicarious liability on a finding
that a reasonable consumer would assume the peas were made "espe-
cially for the house-brander," since such an assumption may induce
the consumer to purchase the goods in reliance on the general reputa-
tion of the supermarket. The consumer may fairly assume that the
supermarket would not commission independent canneries without
first insuring that they are of sound reputation, competent and careful.
The situation is somewhat different in the trademark-licensing
context. When consumers purchase goods that have been manufac-
tured pursuant to a trademark licensing arrangement, their perceptions
of the respective roles of the licensor and licensee are likely to be
murky. That is, they are not likely to know whether the licensor had
the goods made especially for it or not. In such situations, the second
prong of section 400 is not likely to arise unless two different trade-
marks-signifying two different entities-appear on a single product.
That is so because if only one mark appears on licensed goods, con-
sumers probably will assume that the goods were made by the entity
they usually associate with that particular mark-unless, of course,
they ordinarily associate the licensor with a wholly different line of
goods and do not think it plausible that the entity they usually associ-
ate with the mark would have manufactured a wholly different type of
product.
An example may be helpful. Assume that the Coca-Cola Com-
pany licenses the Coke trademark to a teddy bear manufacturer. The
manufacturer may, in turn, distribute the goods in one of two ways.
First, the teddy bear maker may (with Coca-Cola's permission) sell
the teddy bears bearing only the Coke trademarks. Consumers pur-
225 See id.
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chasing the bears would likely conclude that the bears were either
manufactured directly by Coca-Cola, by someone else directly for
Coca-Cola, or certainly with Coca-Cola's permission. But consumers
probably would not automatically assume that the teddy bears were
manufactured pursuant to Coca-Cola's standards or specifications
because they do not normally associate Coca-Cola with stuffed ani-
mals and do not presume that it has any expertise in manufacturing
such goods. Should Coca-Cola be liable as an apparent manufacturer
on these facts?
The answer to that question depends in large part on the underly-
ing purpose and logic of the apparent manufacturer doctrine. As we
have seen, the doctrine is a form of estoppel.226 As applied to a
trademark licensor, it means that a licensor will be estopped from de-
nying that it has "held itself out" in a particular manner. But not
every holding out is actionable under the doctrine. Rather, the licen-
sor should be subject to liability under the doctrine only if it has held
itself out in such a manner that it was what it pretended to be, or if it
had in fact done what it pretended to do.
I have argued elsewhere that a trademark licensor should be sub-
ject to a manufacturer's liability if it is the "functional equivalent" of
a manufacturer.227 I have suggested that the key element in deter-
mining such functional equivalence is whether the licensor dictates
the specifications, standards or product warnings for the licensed
goods. Thus, it would seem logical to conclude that a trademark li-
censor should be vicariously liable under the apparent manufacturer
doctrine if it holds itself out as the functional equivalent of a manu-
facturer of a particular product-i.e., as the entity that provided the
specifications or standards for manufacturing the product.
Turning back to our Coke teddy bear example, it is not altogether
clear whether a reasonable consumer would assume that Coca-Cola
either manufactured, or dictated the standards or specifications for
manufacturing or designing, the teddy bears found to be defective.
The difficulty, of course, is that the teddy bear market is far removed
from the normal product in which we are accustomed to seeing Coke
trademarks used, and therefore it is difficult to know whether a rea-
sonable consumer is likely to believe that Coke teddy bears are a
Coke product or a product made according to Coke specifications.
Ultimately, the issue boils down to an empirical question about likely
consumer impressions. To the extent consumers think about the
matter at all, it seems that they are unlikely to assume that Coca-Cola
made, or dictated the standards for making, the teddy bears. Rather,
22' See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
227 See Franklyn, supra note 8, at 49-5 1.
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they are likely to assume that the bears were made by some other en-
tity that was authorized to affix the Coke trademark solely for promo-
tional purposes.
The situation would probably be much simpler if in addition to the
Coke trademark, the trademark of the actual manufacturer also ap-
peared on the teddy bears. For example, if the teddy bears contained
a label stating "Manufactured by the Garanimal Toy Company," the
reasonable consumer would likely conclude that Garanimal manu-
factured the teddy bears and that it did so pursuant to its own stan-
dards and specifications since it is in the toymaking business. In
these circumstances, consumers would be hard-pressed to argue that
Coke held itself out as either the manufacturer, or the functional
equivalent of a manufacturer, of the licensed goods.
It could be argued that the test proposed in this Article necessarily
applies to all licensors who are complying with the federal Lanham
Act, because all such licensors implicitly vouch for the quality of the
licensed goods. Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that
the Lanham Act requires licensors to control the quality of licensed
goods in all instances precisely because a trademark-in and of it-
self-necessarily (though implicitly) signifies that all products bear-
ing that mark emanate from a single source of product "specifications
and standards. '2 8 Under this view of the quality assurance theory,
the consumer, who is unaware of the licensor-licensee relationship,
always believes that the "source" of quality control is either the
manufacturer or some other entity that is controlling the manufac-
turer. If a trademark in and of itself necessarily signifies that the
trademark owner provided the specifications and standards for the
trademarked goods, and if the Lanham Act requires that the trademark
owner actually do so, then arguably all trademark licensors should be
held vicariously liable for the goods on which their marks appear un-
der the test proposed here.
While this argument is compelling, I do not believe it defeats my
larger thesis, because consumers do not necessarily assume that a
trademark signifies that products bearing that mark come from the
same manufacturing source, or even from the same source of quality
control standards. Although it is plausible to think that consumers
generally have such an impression in the classical licensing or fran-
chising contexts, it is not plausible to think that consumers generally
m8 See Parks, supra note 32, at 554 (citing 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS
AND RELATED RIGHTS 1128 (1975) (stating that through the "quality assurance theory"--which
underlies the Lanham Act's quality control requirement--"the source theory has been broad-
ened to include not only manufacturing source but also the source of standards and specifica-
tions of the goods bearing the mark.")).
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have such an impression in the collateral market or promotional li-
censing contexts. For this reason, a number of courts have relaxed
the quality control requirement in the promotional licensing con-
text.229 Moreover, even outside the promotional licensing context,
courts have not generally interpreted the control requirement to mean
that licensors must provide their licensees with product standards and
specifications to avoid a finding of abandonment.2 30 Accordingly, the
test advanced here would have to be applied on a case-by-case basis,
and would require proof that the licensor "held itself out" as the pro-
vider of standards and specifications in a particular case.
C. Proving Reliance
An issue that may arise in apparent manufacturer cases is whether
the plaintiff is required to prove that, at the time she made her pur-
chase, she actually relied on the impression that the trademark owner
made or vouched for the product. Alternatively, it may be sufficient
for her merely to show that the licensor "held itself out" to the public
as an entity that manufactured or vouched for the product. Either ap-
proach is defensible, depending on one's views regarding the under-
lying purposes of the apparent manufacturer doctrine.
If the primary purpose of the doctrine is to hold trademark owners
accountable for the impressions they create about the goods on which
their marks appear, then a pure estoppel theory might be followed
wherein the plaintiff would be allowed to prevail merely by showing
that the licensor held itself out as a manufacturer and thus her mental
state at the time she made her purchase decision would be legally ir-
relevant. This approach would permit plaintiffs to act as "private at-
torneys general," enforcing the general public interest in imposing
legal accountability on trademark licensors who profit from the im-
pression that they made or vouch for their licensees' goods. It would
also permit persons to recover who did not purchase the licensed
product, but who merely used the product or who were incidentally
injured when someone else was using the product.
On the other hand, if the primary purpose of the doctrine is to
protect consumers who detrimentally rely on trademarks as surrogates
for quality and safety, then proof of reliance is essential. Absent
proof that a consumer actually relied on the licensor's holding out,
there is no causal connection between the licensor's implied repre-
sentations and the plaintiff's injury. In the typical case, a plaintiff
will have no problem proving actual reliance. She will simply submit
229 See supra Part IL
230 see id.
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an affidavit so stating. However, matters become more complicated
when the plaintiff is someone other than the purchaser of the product.
If the plaintiff merely used the product or received it by way of gift or
loan, she may be hard-pressed to demonstrate that the person who
bought the product relied in the requisite manner.2
31
This difficulty can be resolved by holding that actual reliance will
be presumed from the very fact that the licensed product was sold to a
consumer. On this view, courts would afford plaintiffs a rebutabble
presumption that the consumer of the product actually relied on the
trademark at the time she purchased the product. A plaintiff would
be required to show only that a reasonable consumer viewing the
product at the time of sale would have concluded that the licensor
manufactured, or dictated the standards for manufacturing, the prod-
uct. The court would then instruct the jury to presume that the actual
consumer so relied. However, the licensor, in turn, would be entitled
to show by way of an affirmative defense that the actual consumer did
not, in fact, rely on the trademark in the proscribed manner. The use
of such a presumption of actual reliance would thus enable mere users
or bystanders to recover under the apparent manufacturer doctrine.
D. Disclaimers
This section considers whether licensors should be permitted to
negate any implication that they made or dictated the standards for
making, the licensed goods by so stating on product labels. The pri-
mary problem with disclaimers is not in deciding whether they are
justifiable as a theoretical matter, but rather in deciding whether a
particular disclaimer is sufficient to immunize a licensor from liability
as an apparent manufacturer.
For example, suppose that General Motors licenses its "GM" mark
to the Kentucky Car Company to use on cars the latter company
manufactures for GM. Further suppose that in addition to the pres-
ence of both companies' trademarks, the car contains a large sticker
which reads as follows: "THIS CAR WAS DESIGNED, ENGI-
NEERED AND MANUFACTURED SOLELY BY THE KEN-
TUCKY CAR COMPANY, ACCORDING TO ITS OWN SPECIFI-
CATIONS, GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS." Here, the mes-
sages are mixed. On the one hand, the presence of GM trademarks
seems to convey the message that GM manufactured the car; on the
other hand, the disclaimer specifically says it did not. Most observers
231 See, e.g., Golden v. Kishwaukee Community Health Servs. Ctr., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 319,
326-27 (11. App. Ct. 1994) (allowing an unconscious patient transmitted in ambulance to base
apparent agency claim on the driver's impression that emergency room doctors were apparent
agents of hospital).
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would wonder why GM's marks would appear on a car that was nei-
ther made by GM, nor made according to its specifications or stan-
dards.
Moreover, it is unlikely that GM would enter into such a licensing
arrangement, for fear that its licensee would damage the reputation
and value of GM's marks in the very market where these marks are
most used-i.e., the automobile market. GM may, however, enter
into such a licensing arrangement in a collateral market, such as the
automobile accessory market, where GM's marks may appear beside
the marks of the actual manufacturer (say, of floor mats) that contain
a similar disclaimer. In either case, consumers may find it difficult to
argue that GM was the "apparent manufacturer" of the goods if they
bore an explicit disclaimer of the type set forth above.
Indeed, comment (d) to section 400 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts takes the position that the apparent manufacturer doctrine
does not apply if the goods clearly indicate the identity of the actual
manufacturer and state that the trademark owner had nothing to do
with the goods other than to "label" them.232 To meet the latter test,
GM's hypothetical disclaimer would have to be revised to read as
follows: 'THIS CAR WAS DESIGNED, ENGINEERED AND
MANUFACTURED SOLEY BY THE KENTUCKY CAR COM-
PANY, ACCORDING TO IT'S OWN SPECIFICATIONS, STAN-
DARDS AND GUIDELINES. GM HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH
THE GOODS OTHER THAN TO ALLOW THE COMPANY TO USE
GM'S TRADEMARKS FOR PROMOTIONAL PURPOSES."
The problem with this type of disclaimer is that it makes sense in
the house-branding context in which the apparent manufacturer doc-
trine originated, but not in the licensing context. Because house-
branding sellers are not trademark "licensors," they are not governed
by the Lanham Act. Accordingly, they can legally disclaim any in-
volvement with the goods other than to distribute or sell them. In
contrast, the trademark licensor can not necessarily make such a dis-
claimer, for two reasons. First, the trademark licensor typically can
not say that its only involvement with the goods was distributing or
selling them since licensors do not ordinarily distribute or sell the li-
censed goods-rather, licensees do.
Second, the trademark licensor may not be able to say that it was
not involved in any way with the licensed goods. As we have seen,
the Lanham Act requires a trademark licensor to "control the quality"
of the licensed goods or risk a finding that it has abandoned its
232 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965).
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mark. 33 Although courts have not clearly defined the quality control
requirement, 4 that requirement must at least mean that the licensor
had some form of "involvement" with the licensed goods. If this is
true, though, the licensor can not honestly represent what it needs to
represent to escape liability under comment (d) to section 400. What
this means is that a licensor would never escape liability as an appar-
ent manufacturer through the use of a disclaimer if comment (d) were
applied literally in the licensing context.
A possible solution to this problem would be to hold that comment
(d) should not be applied literally to licensors, but rather should be
modified to reflect a licensor's quality control requirements under the
Lanham Act. For example, it would seem appropriate to hold that a
sufficient disclaimer in the licensing context need not state that the
licensor "had nothing to do with the goods," but rather that the goods
were manufactured by another named entity according to its own
specifications and standards. There does not appear to be anything in
the Lanham Act or in the case law preventing licensors from making
235
such a disclaimer in appropriate circumstances.
The authors of the Third Restatement of Torts take a novel ap-
proach to the disclaimer issue. As we have seen, they limit the appar-
ent manufacturer doctrine generally to the house-branding context. 36
However, they contend that the doctrine makes house-branders liable
even if a house-branded product clearly discloses that an identified
manufacturer produced the product especially for the seller.237 Con-
trary to the position taken in the Second Restatement, the Third Re-
statement does not appear to allow a house brander to escape liability
through the use of any type of disclaimer.238
In support of its rejection of disclaimers, the new Restatement ar-
gues that consumers at least partially rely on the reputation of the
trademark owner even where it is clear that another entity manufac-
tured the goods.239 The Restatement further asserts that this supposed
partial reliance is, by itself, grounds for imposing liability on the
trademark owner, at least in the house-branding context. Thus, com-
ment (c) to section 14 of the new Restatement states:
23 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. Notice that the quality control require-
ment does not apply to house-branders because they do not license the use of their marks to
others, but rather use their own marks on goods made by others.
2 See supra Part II(D).
235 But see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
236 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILtTY § 14 cmt. c (1998).
237 see id.
28 see id.
239 see id.
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Representing oneself as the manufacturer or as one for
whom the product has been specially manufactured. When a
commercial seller sells a product manufactured by another
under its own trademark or logo, the seller is liable as though
it was the manufacturer. The rule applies even if the seller
discloses that an identified manufacturer produced the prod-
uct especially for the seller. In this circumstance, the seller is
presumed to cause the product to be used or consumed in
part, at least, in reliance on the seller. The seller's reputation
is an implied assurance of the quality of the product, and the
seller should be estopped from denying that it stands behind
that assurance. 
24 0
There are two major problems with the Third Restatement's rejec-
tion of disclaimers.241 First, it is doubtful that comment (c) is an ac-
curate restatement of existing law, as opposed to what the authors of
the new Restatement think the law should be.242 Several courts, fol-
lowing the Second Restatement, have taken a contrary position and
have exempted trademark owners from liability as apparent manu-
facturers when the products at issue bore appropriate labeling indi-
cating the identity of the true manufacturer. 243
Second, the new Restatement's position is not consistent with the
history or the underlying logic of the apparent manufacturer doctrine.
Historically, the apparent manufacturer doctrine was not construed to
encompass every house-branding seller. Rather, the doctrine was
based on the much narrower premise that liability would attach to the
house-brander if consumers were induced to purchase the marked
240 Id. (emphasis added).
241 The Third Restatement's approach may reflect the general antipathy toward disclaimers
in the products liability context for reasons that are not applicable in the trademark-licensing
context. In product liability cases, this antipathy is based on the notion that it is not fair to allow
manufacturers to disclaim liability for defects in the products they produce, since consumers
have considerably less bargaining power than manufacturers. By contrast, the apparent manu-
facturer doctrine is premised on the assumption that the mere presence of a trademark implicitly
represents that the trademark owner made the goods, or that the goods were made especially for
the trademark owner. If the licensor expressly negates this implied representation through a
clear and unequivocal disclaimer, the doctrine simply should not apply. An entity can not ap-
pear to be a manufacturer-or to have commissioned the manufacture of goods-if such ap-
pearances are expressly negated. In the apparent manufacturer doctrine, therefore, bargaining
power disparities should be irrelevant.
242 It is interesting to note that the authors of the New Restatement appear to be shaping
rather than restating law. They categorically states that the apparent manufacturer doctrine does
not apply to trademark licensors, and that the doctrine does not apply despite the presence of a
disclaimer which identifies the actual manufacturer.
23 See, e.g., Holman Motor Co. v. Evans, 314 S.E.2d 453, 454-55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that company was not liable under strict liability because it was not the manufacturer
and the owner's manual clearly identified another company as the manufacturer); see also supra
notes 178, 184 (citing cases).
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goods in reliance on the impression that the seller either manufactured
the goods or had them manufactured especially for itself. The doc-
trine was not premised on the much broader notion that house-
branding sellers necessarily vouch for the quality of the goods or
promise to stand behind those goods. Nor was it based on a notion
that consumers always purchase the goods in reliance on the reputa-
tion of the seller, even when the identity of the actual manufacturer is
disclosed.
Indeed, if the doctrine had been construed this broadly, it would
have applied to all sellers, even if their brand names or marks did not
appear on the goods. Consumers frequently purchase goods from
reputable sellers on the assumption that those sellers tend to carry a
certain quality of goods. For example, a consumer may buy vacuum
cleaners from Sears because one assumes that all the vacuum cleaners
Sears sells are of an adequate quality, regardless of whether they bear
the "Sears" trademark. But the apparent manufacturer doctrine was
never construed to encompass sellers in this situation. Only by
broadening the scope of the doctrine beyond its historical origins have
the authors of the new Restatement been able to construct a rationale
to justify their rejection of disclaimers.
If the apparent manufacturer doctrine is confined to its historical
footings, disclaimers should be a means by which trademark owners
can escape liability as apparent manufacturers in the trademark-
licensing context. Indeed, a strong argument can be made that even
in the classical licensing situation, licensors should be permitted to
negate the possibility of strict liability by clearly disclosing the iden-
tity of the actual manufacturer on the licensed goods and by con-
spicuously stating that the goods were manufactured according to the
standards of the trademark. In such circumstances, consumers could
not legitimately claim to have purchased the goods in reliance on the
impression that the licensor provided the standards and specifications
for making the goods.
Finally, it may be true that consumers purchase goods in re-
liance on a trademark licensor's reputation, even where the
identity of the actual manufacturer is clearly displayed and the
goods indicate that the licensor did not control the standards or
specifications for making the goods. Indeed, such consumer
reliance probably occurs every time a teenage boy buys Air Jor-
dan Nike gym shoes. In fact, it may be desirable as matter of
public policy to hold licensors liable in such circumstances un-
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der a broad consumer reliance rationale.244 Yet, even if it is true
that consumers always purchase goods in partial reliance on the
reputation of a trademark licensor, that fact alone should not be
sufficient to defeat a licensor's ability to negate its liability as
an apparent manufacturer through the use of an appropriate
disclaimer.
E. A Proposed Safe Harbor
It might be desirable to enact laws stating that a trademark licensor
shall not be required to defend against an apparent manufacturer
claim if the manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer is subject to service
of process and able to satisfy a likely judgment against it.245 Several
states have adopted similar rules for non-manufacturing sellers such
as wholesalers and retailers. 246  Generally, these statutes state that
non-manufacturing sellers are not subject to strict liability unless the
manufacturer of the defective goods is unable to satisfy a likely
judgment or is outside the jurisdiction of the court.247
There are a number of compelling reasons to enact similar "safe
harbor" statutes for licensors. First, in all cases where a manufacturer
or other entity in the chain of distribution is solvent and subject to
jurisdiction, there is no reason to require yet another entity to incur
fees to defend against a product liability claim that is duplicative of
claims against these other entities.
Second, such a rule would not interfere with the societal interest in
compensating persons who are injured by defective products. This is
so because under the proposed rule, licensors would be immune from
liability as apparent manufacturers only if other entities were not
available to compensate the plaintiffs. 248 Hence, the proposed rule
would minimize legal and insurance costs while at the same time en-
suring adequate compensation.
Third, if reducing legal fees and insurance costs are sufficiently
strong interests to justify such a rule for wholesalers and retailers,
then these interests should also support the adoption of a similar rule
for trademark licensors.
244 Indeed, a fairly compelling argument can be made that all trademark licensors should be
held strictly liable to the same extent as retail sellers generally, since all trademarks stimulate
consumer demand and promote the sale of the licensed goods. See Franklyn, supra note 8, at 46-
47.
245 For a more complete discussion of this subject, see Franklyn, supra note 8, at 63-65.
24 See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (1990); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2621(a)-(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306
(Supp. 1994).
2 See id.248 See Franklyn, supra note 8.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that trademark licensors should be
held liable under the apparent manufacturer doctrine when they in-
duce consumers to believe that they manufactured, or dictated the
standards and specifications for manufacturing, their licensees' goods.
In either situation, the licensor implicitly represents that it stands be-
hind the safety of those goods and should therefore be estopped from
denying otherwise. The contrary position taken by the Third Re-
statement of Torts is not well considered as a matter of logic or public
policy and ignores a substantial body of case law that has applied the
apparent manufacturer doctrine to trademark licensors.
I have also argued that the apparent manufacturer doctrine
should be limited to situations where the plaintiff can prove that, at
the time she purchased the product in question, (1) she actually be-
lieved that the trademark owner made or dictated standards for mak-
ing the product, (2) she purchased the product in reliance on this be-
lief, and (3) such reliance was reasonable and justifiable in the cir-
cumstances. By requiring proof of actual and justifiable reliance,
courts can ensure that there is a causal connection between a licen-
sor's conduct and a plaintiffs injury. However, I have argued that
actual reliance should be presumed when the plaintiff shows that a
reasonable consumer would have relied in the requisite manner and
the defendant fails to show that the actual consumer did not, in fact,
so rely.
Although the application of the test proposed here would depend
on all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, liability proba-
bly would arise more frequently in classical and franchise licensing
situations than in the collateral product and promotional licensing
contexts. This would be so because in the collateral and promotional
licensing context, consumers are considerably less likely to believe
that the licensor manufactured the licensed goods.
This Article has also argued that licensors should be permitted to
use appropriate product labeling to negate any impression that they
manufactured, or dictated the standards or specifications for manu-
facturing, their licensees' goods. An enforceable disclaimer should
be accurate, conspicuous, understandable, and consistent with the li-
censors' quality control obligations under the Lanham Act. Finally,
the article recommended that licensors should be provided with a safe
harbor from liability if they can demonstrate that the actual manufac-
turer of an allegedly defective product is solvent and subject to the
jurisdiction of courts in states where the product is sold. A safe har-
bor of this type would minimize unnecessary litigation and insurance
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costs while still providing injured consumers with an adequate source
of compensation.

